Ahmadiyya Community In Indonesia’s Contemporary Discourse: State’s Indecisive Protection to the Freedom of Religion and Belief
Pradnya Nindita Putri
Faculty of Social and Political Studies, Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia
*e-mail: [email protected]
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ABSTRACT |
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Ahmadiyya, minority, discourse reproduction, critical discourse analysis. |
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Nowadays, Indonesian Ahmadiyya community is the religious minority group with highest number and level of prohibition regulations and persecution. Several studies already shown that this situation was triggered by the 2005 fatwa published by Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia – MUI) which declared the Ahmadiyya as deviant sect and that seemed to be confirmed by the State through the issuance of Joint Decree of 3 Ministers (SKB 3 Menteri) no 3 of 2008 concerning Warnings and Orders to Adherents, Members, and/or Members of the JAI Management and the Community. More than a decade after the issuance of the fatwa and decree, current Minister of Religion that appointed in December 2020, Yaqut Cholil Choumas, stated his desire to affirm the Ahmadiyya’s rights as citizens. In fact, this statement did not stop the persecution experienced by the Ahmadis, as what happened in Sintang District in September 2021. This study highlights that inappropriate State intervention in religious affairs has become one of the triggers that perpetuate the discrimination against minority groups. Along with this reason, this study attempts to examine the State’s narrative on Ahmadiyya’s issue through critical discourse analysis developed by Teun A. van Dijk (1993). This study finds that the State contributes to perpetuating discrimination against minority groups because it provides half-hearted protection for the Ahmadiyya community by placing the values of certain religious beliefs as well as harmony and public order as being more important than freedom of religion and belief. |
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INTRODUCTION
As a state that based its constitution on legal protection for freedom of religion and belief, Indonesia still has many cases of neglect regarding issues of human rights violations, intolerance, and protection of minority groups (Asriyani, 2016). Minority groups, which defined quantitatively in terms of their small number and qualitatively observed from the situation where they receive different treatment and thus experience various forms of injustice, are still victims of discrimination in terms of government regulations and public persecution.
The Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia is currently a minority group with the most prohibitions and experiencing the highest level of persecution. Ahmadiyya community’s spokeperson, Yendra Budiman, stated that there are at least 30 (thirty) regional regulations that prohibit Ahmadiyah activities (Irawan, 2017). In addition, data compiled by the Setara Institute accumulatively from 2007 to 2021 shows that Ahmadiyah is the highest victim of incidents of human rights violations, namely as many as 496 incidents. This number exceeds 50% of the number of incidents of human rights violations experienced by Christians and Shia, which were “only” 231 and 178 incidents respectively.
Ahmadiyya itself is a community that began to spread since the 19th century with the belief to be part of Islam and carry Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as their main preacher (Kusumadewi, 2022). Ahmadiyya teachings have several points of belief and worship mechanisms that are different from the dominant Sunni Islamic stream in Indonesia, so that various groups see Ahmadiyya as a deviation from Islam.
Ahmadiyya teachings arrived in Indonesia around the 1920s. Ahmadiyya got its legal status as a legal religious organization in 1953, so it has the right to run and build houses of worship according to their beliefs. Politically, Ahmadiyah adherents do not have a position against government policies, so they could widely be involved in various public activities. However, differences in beliefs regarding how to respond to the Prophet Muhammad SAW and the "prophetic" status of the founder of Ahmadiyah, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, became the main trigger for various parties to doubt the "truth" of Ahmadiyah.
In 1980, the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI), an Indonesian clerical association which historically was a quasi-government organization, published a fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya not a legitimate part of Islam. MUI republished its fatwa against Ahmadiyya during its VIIth MUI National Conference on July 26th-29th, 2005. MUI stated that this fatwa was an affirmation of the 1980 MUI fatwa regarding the "heretical" Ahmadiyya and an appeal to the Government which was deemed obligated to prohibit the spread of Ahmadiyya throughout Indonesia and to freeze the organization and close all its activities.
This 2005 MUI’s Fatwa became one of impetus for the issuance of the Joint Decree of 3 Ministers (SKB 3 Menteri) no 3 of 2008 concerning Ahmadiyya. This decree stated that "to give a warning and instruct adherents, members, and/or members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation as long as they profess to be Muslim, to stop the spread of interpretations and activities that deviate from the main teachings of Islam". After the issuance of the Joint Decree, MUI declared Ahmadiyya to be a heretical and deviant sect.
After more than a decade after the publication of the 2005 MUI Fatwa and 2008 3 Ministerial Decree on Ahmadiyah, the discrimination experienced by the Ahmadiyya group has not ended. The issue of Ahmadiyya has resurfaced in Indonesia after December 2020 when the government reformed through the Ministry of Religion with the newly appointed Minister of Religion, Yaqut Cholil Choumas, declaring his affirmation of the right to religion and belief for the Ahmadiyya group. The Ministry of Religion as the institution responsible for religious affairs in Indonesia through Minister Choumas also stated his plan to conduct a review of the SKB 3 Ministers no 3 of 2008 which was considered to place the members of the Ahmadiyya community on a hard set (Fuller, 2014).
Minister Choumas' statement did not stop discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community. Less than a year after this statement, the Ahmadiyya mosque in Sintang District, West Kalimantan was attacked by around 200 people on September 3, 2021. A case of rejection of an Ahmadiyya house of worship also occurred in Depok City, West Java, on October 22nd, 2021, when the Al Masjid -Hidayah, the place of worship for the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community in the area was re-sealed by the local government to ensure there was no activity for the Ahmadiyya community in that location (Rahim, 2014). Other cases also occurred, such as the circulation of various banners containing hate speech against Ahmadiyah in Gowa District, South Sulawesi around the beginning of February 2023 until the last case occurred in Sukabumi District, West Java by stopping construction and carrying out sealing madrasa belonging to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation on 10 February 2023.
This study aims to explore the reasons why discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community has not ended, even though the State through the Ministry of Religion has declared its affirmation for this minority group. Meanwhile, several studies have shown that improper state intervention in religious affairs is one of the triggers of this discrimination (Institute., 2023). In terms of regulation, studies by Marshall and Assyaukanie identified a number of regulations that have been discriminatory since their initial publication, including Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning blasphemy and regulations related to the establishment of houses of worship. These discriminatory regulations become a trigger for hate speech and a loophole for committing violence against minority groups just because they seem to be insulting religion because of their beliefs that "deviate" from the beliefs that are generally accepted in the majority of religious communities.
A study from Platzdasch & Saravanamuttu also sees that the State has in fact become an arena for its elites to play between the camps of religious bigotry to make it a shield for the truth of state interference in religious affairs (Burhani, 2013). In his study, Abdi also holds the same opinion, namely that "public order" and "religious values" become the main justifications in various State narratives when addressing the boisterous situation and debate regarding freedom of religion and belief in Indonesia.
Based on the literature review of these studies, this study argues that the State has played a role in perpetuating discrimination against religious minorities, including the Ahmadiyya community. In this regard, studies from Rahim and Asriyani and Qodir both highlight discrimination against Ahmadiyah from a legal standpoint, especially with the circulation of the Three Ministerial Joint Decree (SKB) number 3 of 2008 concerning Ahmadiyah. Rahim emphasizes that this Joint Decree has an impact not only on Ahmadiyya followers, but also on the public. As a result, the SKB 3 Ministers added to the confusion of the conflict relationship between Ahmadiyah and the public, which was not only based on a single cause (Agama., 2021).
Other studies specific to the Ahmadiyya community, such as studies from Mudzakkir (2011), Burhani (2013), and Hicks (2014) also agree that state intervention has had a major impact on the discrimination experienced by this group. Mudzakkir sees that the high level of violence experienced by the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia is a deliberate process of minorization. He sees this process as the impact of a liberal democratic system that marginalizes community voices in small numbers because the marginalization of these groups does not have a significant impact on vote acquisition and the electability of officials. The findings from Burhani's study are that the labeling of a minority group that is said to be deviant, in this case referring to the Ahmadiyya group in Indonesia, is a product of an alliance between the religious elite, namely the ulama, and the state as the formal bureaucratic elite. Even though the attacks on Ahmadiyya were started by mass organizations, the State was present as the holder of power to legitimize the legitimacy of these attacks. In line with the findings of Burhani (2013), Hicks (2014) stated that the big problem in discriminatory situations experienced by the Ahmadiyya group is the standardization of certain versions of Islamic beliefs through legitimacy validated by formal institutions, that is referring to the State (Assyaukanie, 2018).
Related to this situation, Van Dijk believes that racism, discrimination, and other inequalities can only survive if they are continuously reproduced and disseminated through various acts of exclusion, inferiorization or marginalization. Such actions need to be supported by an ideological system and by a set of attitudes that legitimize differences and domination through language instruments that make use of the "sacredness" of religious issues. In this mechanism, discourse is the main means for the construction and reproduction of the socio-cognitive framework (Van Dijk, "Denying racism: Elite discourse and racism." Discourse and Society 3, no. 1 , 1992).
Studies developed by Fuller and Irawan showed that it is important to study discourse because discourse becomes the mechanism and tool for internalizing values to the public. Fuller's study uses text material from various media related to the issue of Ahmadiyya, while the study from Irawan looks at perceptions of Ahmadiyya from opposing elites by using da'wah speech material from a number of religious leaders, especially the leadership of the mass organization Front Pembela Islam (FPI) which takes a very hostile position to Ahmadiyah. They conclude that it is discourse that makes discrimination the “right” thing. Minority groups, including the Ahmadiyya, are placed as those who are "other", so that their existence is seen as "moral destroyer", "traitor to religion", and other similar things which are indicated as a challenge to the sacredness of religion.
From the studies elaborated above, this study seeks to identify how the narratives conveyed by the State against Ahmadiyah (Sanubari, 2023). Through these narrations, we can observe the State's attitude towards the existence of the Ahmadiyya community to see how far the State has played a role in stopping discrimination or in fact helping to perpetuate discrimination against this minority group. For this reason, the object of study in this study is the narratives from the Ministry of Religion on Ahmadiyya which were conveyed after Minister Choumas' statement in December 2020 regarding his desire to affirm the existence of Ahmadiyya and to review the Joint Decree number 3 of 2008. These narratives were taken from the official website of the Ministry of Religion, namely www.kemenag.go.id, so that it can be said as the state's official attitude towards Ahmadiyya Indonesia.
METHODS
The methodology used in this study is a qualitative approach using the critical discourse analysis method developed by Teun A. van Dijk. The critical discourse analysis method is used because the researcher's position in looking at the situation of discrimination experienced by minority groups, including the Ahmadiyya group, is that no discrimination occurs accidentally. Critical discourse analysis becomes significant because the forms and practices of modern power more often lead to the control and management of thoughts, which include the influence and internalization of knowledge, beliefs, understandings, plans, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values. In this process, discourse becomes an instrument that bridges social cognition, namely a social representation because it is shared and understood among group members, so that it becomes the basis for interaction among group members.
Van Dijk's (1993) critical discourse analysis mechanism does not only involve elements of text analysis, but involves several levels of analysis, namely analysis of control over access, control over context, and control over social cognition. In relation to access, it is assumed that the more access and wider access to narrative control possessed by the ruling party, the wider the power of control or influence they have. Conversely, the weakness of power can also be seen from the lack of access to discourse.
The context can be categorized into two parts, namely the macro context and the micro context. The macro context can be composed of the categories that make up the situation, such as the background, the agenda in the events that took place, the parties involved, to the representations used regarding certain goals, knowledge, opinions, or ideologies. On the other hand, control over context in the microscope involves content and structure over text and narrative. This involves controlling speech acts, genres, and controlling the topic of the narration and its changes. Micro context control also involves the structure of the text, such as the details of the meaning, form, or specific terms used.
The next element, which is control over social cognition, is how existing social representations are created and reused, thereby turning the reproduction cycle of these representations in the discourse conveyed to the public. Social cognition becomes the basis for the organization of individuals and society, including controlling individual actions in that society, thus reproducing what is "right" and "wrong", as well as things what is permissible or should be done and what is not supposed to be done or prohibited.
The data collection from this study is based on digitally extracted documents. The data collection technique is to access the official website of the Ministry of Religion and use the search engine on the website with the keyword "Ahmadiyah". Articles published by the Ministry of Religion with appropriate keywords are the object of analysis in this study (Mudzakkir, 2011).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
State’s Narration of Persecution Experienced by the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community
As data taken in March 2023, this study identified three (3) articles on the official Ministry of State website (www.kemenag.go.id) relating to the issue of Ahmadiyah. These articles are specifically the Ministry of Religion's response to the attack experienced by the Ahmadiyya community in Sintang District in September 2021, each of which is entitled "Condemning the Destruction of Houses of Worship in Sintang, Minister of Religion Requests Apparatus to Take Firm Action" dated 3 September 2021, "Ministry of Religion Deploys Counselors to Socialize Ahmadiyah Rules” dated 9 September 2021, and “Ministry of Religion Urges the JAI Sintang House of Worship to Function as a Mosque for All Muslims” dated 3 January 2022.
The first article[i], namely the "Condemns the Destruction of Houses of Worship in Sintang, Minister of Religion Requests Apparatus to Take Firm Action" dated September 3, 2021, contains a statement by Minister Choumas condemning the destruction as an act of vigilante action. The following is quoted from a related article regarding Minister Choumas' statement:
Minister of Religion Yaqut Cholil Choumas condemned the destruction of the Ahmadiyya congregation's place of worship in Sintang District, West Kalimantan by a group of people. According to him, vigilante action cannot be justified and is a violation of the law.
"The actions of a group of vigilantes destroying other people's houses of worship and property cannot be justified and is a clear violation of the law," stressed the Minister of Religion in Jakarta, Friday (3/9/2021).
Menteri Agama Yaqut Cholil Choumas mengecam perusakan tempat ibadah jemaat Ahmadiyah di Kabupaten Sintang, Kalimantan Barat oleh sekelompok orang. Menurutnya, tindakan main hakim sendiri tidak bisa dibenarkan dan merupakan pelanggaran hukum.
“Tindakan sekelompok orang yang main hakim sendiri merusak rumah ibadah dan harta benda milik orang lain tidak bisa dibenarkan dan jelas merupakan pelanggaran hukum,” tegas Menag di Jakarta, Jumat (3/9/2021).
(Contributor of Ministry of Religion, 2021).
Minister Choumas said that the act of taking the law into his own hands was a "real threat to religious harmony", so thus emphasizing that the security forces take firm action and process it legally. Minister Choumas also asked regional governments to be able to carry out their functions in maintaining religious harmony in their respective regions (Platzdasch, 2014).
The second article, namely "Ministry of Religion Deploys Counselors to Socialize Ahmadiyah Rules" dated 9 September 2021, is a follow-up and confirmation of the first article. In this article, it is stated that the Ministry of Religion mobilized Islamic Religious Counselors (PAI) to socialize the SKB 3 Ministers number 3 of 2008 concerning Warnings and Orders to Adherents, Members, and/or Members of the JAI Board and Community Members. According to Kamaruddin Amin, the Director General of Islamic Community Guidance at the Ministry of Religion, if the SKB 3 Ministers are adhered to together, then nothing untoward will happen. The following is a direct quote from Kamaruddin Amin's statement, as described in the article:
According to Kamaruddin, the SKB signed by the Minister of Religion, Minister of Home Affairs and the Attorney General has provided clear guidelines regarding the position of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.
"It is very clear what must be done, what must the Ahmadiyah do, what should the community do, and what should the security forces do, that is actually clear in the letter," explained the Professor of UIN Alaudin Makassar.
He emphasized that in order to overcome the Ahmadiyya problem, it is not justified to use violence and one cannot take justice into his own hands. However, on the other hand, the Ahmadiyya congregation must also implement what is stated in the SKB of the three Ministers.
“Ahmadiyah may not spread ideas, religious interpretations, that there is a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad, this cannot be done. It is not permissible on the basis of human rights, on the basis that all people have the same basic rights in this nation, whatever the reason, it is not permissible. Because this understanding has the potential to violate the PNPS Law No. 1 of 1965 concerning the Prevention of Misuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion," added Kamaruddin.
Menurut Kamaruddin, SKB yang ditandatangani Menteri Agama, Menteri Dalam Negeri, dan Jaksa Agung ini telah memberikan panduan yang jelas terkait kedudukan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia.
“Sangat jelas sekali apa yang harus dilakukan, pihak Ahmadiyah harus ngapain, masyarakat harus ngapain, dan aparat keamanan harus ngapain, itu sebenarnya jelas dalam surat itu,” jelas Guru Besar UIN Alaudin Makassar ini.
Ia menegaskan, untuk mengatasi permasalahan Ahmadiyah ini tidak dibenarkan melakukan kekerasan serta tidak boleh main hakim sendiri. Tetapi, di sisi lain, jemaat Ahmadiyah juga harus melaksanakan apa yang tertuang dalam SKB tiga Menteri tersebut.
“Ahmadiyah tidak boleh menyebarkan faham, tafsir agama, bahwa ada nabi setelah Nabi Muhammad, tidak boleh dilakukan. Tidak boleh atas dasar hak azasi manusia atas dasar semua orang punya hak dasar yang sama dalam bangsa ini, apapun alasannya itu tidak boleh. Karena paham itu berpotensi melanggar UU PNPS no 1 tahun 1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/ atau Penodaan Agama,” tambah Kamaruddin.
(Contributor of Ministry of Religion, 2021)
Meanwhile, the third article[ii], namely "Ministry of Religion Urges the JAI Sintang House of Worship to Function as a Mosque for All Muslims" dated January 3, 2022, describes the follow-up of the Ministry of Religion towards the existence of the Ahmadiyya group in Sintang District, especially in terms of carrying out their worship. The follow-up was explained by the Head of the Center for Religious Harmony (PKUB) of the Ministry of Religion, Wawan Djunaedi. The excerpt from the article is as follows:
The dome of the mosque, the house of worship for the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Muslim Congregation (JAI) in Sintang, West Kalimantan, has been dismantled for conversion. Head of the Center for Religious Harmony (PKUB) of the Ministry of Religion, Wawan Djunaidi, appealed to the house of worship to continue to function as a mosque for all Muslims.
Kubah masjid rumah ibadah Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di Sintang Kalimantan Barat telah dibongkar untuk dilakukan alih fungsi. Kepala Pusat Kerukunan Umat Beragama (PKUB) Kemenag Wawan Djunaidi mengimbau agar rumah ibadah tersebut tetap difungsikan sebagai masjid bagi seluruh umat Islam.
(Contributor of Ministry of Religion, 2022).
Referred to that article, Wawan Djunaedi also mentioned the Joint Regulations of the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs number 9 and number 8 of 2006 concerning the establishment of houses of worship. It is said that the establishment of a house of worship must meet administrative requirements, technical requirements, and special requirements, including that there are at least 90 prospective users of the house of worship (Mirsan, 2023). Because there are only 72 people in the Ahmadiyya community in Sintang District, Wawan Djunaedi stated that those who wish to build a house of worship can apply for a permit to use a temporary place of worship from the local government. In addition, Wawan Djunaedi also appealed to members of the Ahmadiyya community to worship together with other Muslims in any mosque, according to his statement as follows:
To all Muslims, Wawan asked them to accept JAI members to worship together at the mosque or prayer room. JAI members are also encouraged to worship together with other Muslims, in any mosque.
"It should be, all religious people can live together with adherents of different religions or adherents of other religions with tolerance, harmony and mutual respect," he said.
Kepada seluruh umat Muslim, Wawan mengajak mereka agar dapat menerima anggota JAI untuk beribadah bersama-sama di masjid atau musala. Anggota JAI juga diimbau untuk beribadah secara bersama-sama dengan umat Muslim lainnya, di masjid mana pun.
“Sudah seharusnya, seluruh umat beragama dapat hidup bersama-sama dengan penganut seagama yang berbeda paham atau penganut agama lain dengan toleran, rukun, dan saling menghargai,” tandasnya.
(Contributor of Ministry of Religion, 2022)
Control Over Access and Context in the Narrative of the Ministry of Religion Against Ahmadiyya
As the institution that is authorized and responsible for religious affiars in Indonesia, this study identified a number of accesses controlled by the Ministry of Religion, particularly regarding the existence of the Ahmadiyya community. These accesses are related to the regulatory, coordination, supervision, and information functions owned by the Ministry of Religion (Marshall, 2018).
In terms of regulation, the Ministry of Religion has the authority to stipulate regulations regarding religion and beliefs of all Indonesian citizens. This includes regulations related to minority groups, so that. The authority over this regulation is also related to the coordinating function of the Ministry of Religion, which has a bureaucratic hierarchy that spreads to provinces in Indonesia, so that every policy, regulation, issue or other discourse can be distributed systematically. The Ministry of Religion also has the authority to review and revoke regulations that are deemed inappropriate to be replaced with new regulations that are more inclusive, especially for religious minorities. Besides being able to have internal coordination, the Ministry of Religion is also able to be linked and put pressure on other state institutions to help fulfill the role of the Ministry, including the police, courts, and other ministries. This is important to ensure the fulfillment of legal protection for minority groups, including to act against perpetrators of persecution that has repeatedly been experienced by the Ahmadiyya community.
Besides the authority in controlling regulations and coordination related to religious affairs, the Ministry of Religion also has a supervisory function and able to force branches under its hierarchy to carry out their duties and comply with the rules issued by the Ministry of Religion (Agama., “Kemenag Imbau Rumah Ibadah JAI Sintang Difungsikan Sebagai Masjid Seluruh Umat Islam”, 2022). In addition, like other high state institutions, the Ministry of Religion has broad access to the media. Statements submitted by the Ministry of Religion will always be seen as credible by the media, so that discourse delivered by the Ministry of Religion will almost certainly get coverage in the media. With this access, the Ministry of Religion can encourage certain issues to receive media attention, so that important issues receive public and public attention and can encourage other related institutions to carry out problem solving on related issues.
When the access owned by the Ministry of Religion is related to the context as presented through its articles related to Ahmadiyya, it is very unfortunate that this access is not utilized optimally. In the first article, namely the article "Condemning the Destruction of Houses of Worship in Sintang, Minister of Religion Requests Apparatus to Take Firm Action" dated 3 September 2021, this study sees it as the reluctance of the Ministry of Religion to coordinate, both internal and external ministries, in dealing with Ahmadiyya issues.
Observing the article’s content, it is regrettable that Minister Choumas did not send specific instructions or requests to the authorities to take firm action against the perpetrators of violence against the Ahmadiyya community in Sintang District. The Ministry of Religion also did not mobilize its regional hierarchy to provide handling of the case. In fact, one of the accesses controlled by the State, in this case the Ministry of Religion, is that the institutions within it are interrelated and coordinated. This implies that the Ahmadiyya issue is not an issue that must be followed up quickly and decisively, because it is seen as an issue in a gray area whose follow-up triggers concerns.
Minister Choumas himself was not firm in his closing sentence that regional governments were asked to be able to carry out their functions in maintaining religious harmony in their respective regions. This statement does not give meaning to the role of the Ministry of Religion in addressing the Ahmadiyya issue. The statement also does not provide clear and transparent instructions for follow-up that is similar, unambiguous, and does not have multiple interpretations between local governments in different locations (Agama., “Kemenag Kerahkan Penyuluh Sosialisasikan Aturan Ahmadiyah”, 2021).
In relation to its regulatory function, it can be said that the Ministry “covered” behind existing regulations even though these regulations have received criticism from parties such as academics and human rights activists. In the second article, namely "Ministry of Religion Deploys Counselors to Socialize Ahmadiyya Rules" dated 9 September 2021, the Ministry of Religion representative stated that the Joint Decree no 3 of 2008 should be a reference for attitudes for all Indonesian citizens, even though this regulation can be said to have pushed the Ahmadiyah community into a corner. In this regulation, it is stated that Ahmadiyah adherents may not carry out activities that indicate the spread of their belief and that violations of this can be subject to sanctions. This Joint Decree implicitly states that Ahmadiyya is in an “unrighteous” and “dangerous” position (Abdi A. P., 2021). The Joint Decree also used considerations of mainstream religious values and beliefs, even though matters of belief are an internuum forum of each religion's adherents. This is also not in line with Minister Choumas' statement in December 2020 that Joint Decree number 3 of 2008 should be reviewed if there are indications that it was one of the triggers for violence and discrimination experienced by the Ahmadiyya community.
In this article, the Ministry of Religion representative also clearly stated its objection to prioritizing human rights and the rights of citizens to express opinions as stated in the constitution. In this case, the Ministry of Religion refers to Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 which is often referred to as the “Anti Blasphemy Law”. This regulation itself is considered ambiguous and has been proposed to the Constitutional Court to be repealed, although it was decided to be rejected by the Constitutional Court. The regulation can be said to be ambiguous in terms of its interpretation and puts minority groups in a corner because their beliefs can be said to "deviate" from the beliefs of the majority.
As for the third article, which titled "Ministry of Religion Urges the JAI Sintang House of Worship to Function as a Mosque for All Muslims", the Ministry of Religion representative once again uses an ambiguous regulation, namely Joint Regulations of the Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs number 9 and number 8 of 2006 regarding the establishment of houses of worship. This regulation can also be said to be discriminatory because it seems to make it difficult for minority groups to own houses of worship forever. In fact, this regulation is also widely used as a loophole to criminalize minority groups (Van Dijk, 1993)
The supervisory function of the Ministry of Religion related to religious regulations also tends to be carried out half-heartedly. This is reflected in the contents of the second article, titled "Ministry of Religion Deploys Instructors to Socialize Ahmadiyah Rules" dated 9 September 2021. The State through the Ministry of Religion also seems to place the blame on the Ahmadiyya community and society by stating ""It is very clear what must be done, what should the Ahmadiyah do, what should the community do, and what should the security forces do, that is actually clear in the letter”. This statement seems to ignore the reality on the ground that not all parties understand, or understand in the same way, the contents of the Joint Decree no 3 of 2008. On the one hand, this statement ignores that the Ahmadiyya community is already considered "heretical" and on the other hand it also ignores that not all parties understand the Joint Decree with the same meaning. Most of the public tends to understand that the Joint Decree itself thinks that Ahmadiyya is part of a "deviant" sect without bothering to read and interpret the contents of the Joint Decree in depth.
Control Over Social Cognition in the Narrative of the Ministry of Religion Against Ahmadiyya
The three articles related to the Ahmadiyya issue which were published on the official website of the Ministry of Religion can describe the attitude of the State in general, namely that the State continues to place Ahmadiyah as the "guilty" party, especially from the point of view of religious values accepted by the majority (Abdi, 2014). In this case, the State reproduces social cognition labeling Ahmadiyah as a "heretical" belief by prioritizing other values such as "public order" and "harmony". The Ministry of Religion seems to be ignoring a more urgent matter, namely that the discrimination experienced by the Ahmadiyya community makes them insecure forever from potential violence and persecution.
This is reflected in the contents of the second article, namely the article "Ministry of Religion Deploys Counselors to Socialize Ahmadiyya Rules" dated 9 September 2021, as in the sentence, "Ahmadiyya may not spread understanding, religious interpretation, that there was a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad, this cannot be done". Through this statement, the State uses an Islamic interpretation based on the internal belief which cannot be intervened by other parties, including the State (Suwanti, 2021).
The third article can be said to be even worse in cornering the Ahmadiyah adherents. The mosque which is a place of worship for Ahmadiyah adherents in Sintang has been urged to dismantle it and adapt it to the majority belief in the area (Hicks, 2014). This article also implicitly places the blame on the Ahmadiyah adherents by stating that they are the ones who are intolerant of fellow Muslims and cannot mingle with the public. Thus, the context in the text of this article has once again reshaped the biased and discriminatory representation of Ahmadiyah adherents.
Once again, through the article the Ministry of Religion indicated that it was ignorant of the actual situation on the ground, that the Ahmadiyah community had already received discriminatory treatment from the public. The statements of the Ministry of Religion seem to insist that the minority must sublimate among the majority and lose their identity. This ignores the important point that state intervention must be neutral by protecting citizens through considerations of equality and justice.
CONCLUSION
This study comes from anxiety as to why the discriminatory situation experienced by religious minorities in Indonesia, especially the Ahmadiyya community, does not end even though the Ministry of Religion as the high institution responsible for all citizens' religious affairs has already stated its desire to affirm protection for the Ahmadiyya community. As for previous studies, it indicated that inappropriate State intervention contributed to the persistence of this discriminatory situation, so this study intends to examine how the narrative conveyed by the State regarding the existence of the Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia. Specifically, this study highlights the narratives conveyed by the Ministry of Religion through its website as the state's official communication channel after the statement by the Minister of Religion, Yaqut Cholil Choumas, who stated his affirmation to protect the Ahmadiyya community in December 2020.
This study found that the Ministry of Religion’s official website, www.kemenag.go.id, released several articles regarding to Ahmadiyya issue, especially those related with the persecution experienced by the Ahmaddis in Sintang District in September 2021. By the critical discourse analysis conveyed on these articles, broadly speaking, it can be said that the State through the Ministry of Religion uses its control over access to reproduce existing social representations that Ahmadiyya is a deviant sect.
The State reproduces discriminative narratives through several mechanisms. First, the State does not carry out its regulatory function, especially in terms of reviewing religious rules that are considered problematic, such as Joint Decree of 3 Ministers no 3 of 2008 on Ahmadiyya. The State often uses these problematic regulations, including the Joint Decree of 3 Ministers no 3 of 2008, Law no 1/PNPS/1965, and Joint Regulations of the Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs number 9 and number 8 of 2006 concerning the Establishment of Houses of Worship, as “cover” to justify its actions and responses. In the narratives as reflected in the articles published by the Ministry of Religion regarding Ahmadiyya, these regulations have been reappointed, so that it seems as if they are increasingly giving no room for the existence of minority groups.
Second, the State through the Ministry of Religion also does not utilize its access of coordination, both internal and external ministries, which should be comprehensive in dealing with violence and persecution experienced by the Ahmadiyya community. The Ministry of Religion did not issue a request or instruction to the authorities, such as the Police or the Courts, to strictly follow up on this act of violence. Clear instructions were also not conveyed by the Ministry of Religion to regional governments or Ministry representatives stationed in the regions. The State also does not utilize its information function and cooperate with the media to raise this issue as urgent and significant news.
Third, the Ministry of Religion also ignores its supervisory function by tending to be "hands off". These things are reflected in the statements of the representatives of the Ministry of Religion in the articles above which stated that religious harmony should be the responsibility of the regional government and that interested parties, including the public, should already be aware of the things that are their respective responsibilities.
Fourth, the Ministry of Religion also ignores the existing social cognition that Ahmadiyah is seen as a deviant sect by the public. In its narrative, the Ministry of Religion tends to lean towards the values of the majority beliefs, so that it often discriminates against the Ahmadiyya community. This can be implicitly captured from the statement of the Ministry of Religion that the issue of belief should not be arbitrary even though it is based on human rights and freedom of opinion, as well as the follow-up of the Ministry of Religion in dealing with violence in Sintang Regency which was quite "absurd", namely by ordering the demolition and conversion of the dome of the Ahmadiyya community mosque so that it becomes “normal” like mainstream Muslim community mosques.
The study of the narratives in the articles published by the Ministry of Religion found that the State has done it by omission by placing the Ahmadiyya community under half-hearted protection. Explicitly, the State declares its protection for minority groups, but implicitly it can be seen that the State prioritizes values such as majority religious beliefs, public order, and harmony over human rights in religion and belief. Through these narratives, so far, the State has contributed to reproducing the social representation of Ahmadiyya as a community with deviant beliefs, thereby perpetuating the discrimination experienced by this minority group.
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