

# Power Hegemony: The New Era of Chinese Socialism with the Character of Xi Jinping

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## ABSTRACT

*This research seeks to unravel the influence of Xi Jinping's "superpower" on the world as a sign of a new era of Chinese socialism with the character of Xi Jinping. Reliable and mystical ideas put Xi Jinping on an equal footing with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This means that the dogma of Chinese socialism is entering a new era with the character of Xi Jinping's thought. Using the theory of hegemony proposed by Ernesto Laclau, this research reveals Xi Jinping's ideas that are the truth agreement of Chinese society and the regions within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. More than his predecessors, Xi Jinping sought to lock down western ideas and promote economic harmonization of a version of "market socialism".*

## INTRODUCTION

The big idea of this research is to trace the development of Chinese socialism in the Xi Jinping era. China's rise in global trade has locked in liberal capitalism ideas that privilege individual ownership. Where collective representation i.e. the state has a central role in the management of production and distribution. Chinese socialism can be argued differently from the history of socialism in Europe and some other countries. Therefore, it is important to unravel the character of Chinese socialism based on Xi Jinping's ideas. It is certain that this research has a critical scientific contribution to the development of science focusing on the ideals of socialism to realize a global communist society. It will be very tempting and interesting again to discuss because it uses a critical approach to Ernesto Laclau's hegemony. This approach aims to find the discursive power of Xi's populism related to the development of Chinese socialism in the global political arena that has succeeded in tempting the attention of the world community.

On May 3, 2018, Xi Jinping gave a political speech at an event commemorating Marx's 200th birthday at the Great Hall of the People. The event was conducted openly, both for domestic and international publications. In his speech, Xi Jinping said that Marxism-Leninism is integral in the development of Chinese socialism. In addition, at the occasion of the 95th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping affirmed that China's main agenda is to build socialism to achieve a kumunistic society. This argument was reaffirmed by the *People Publishing House* by publishing the report of the 19th CCP Congress on October 18, 2017 on efforts to secure development victories aimed at prosperity in all respects and striving for the great success of socialism with Chinese character.

It is inevitable that Chinese socialism enters a new era. Nevertheless, Chinese socialism is still based on the framework of Marxism. Where the main agenda of socialism is to realize a society of communism or a classless society. In addition, the thing that shocked the international community the most in the development of Chinese socialism was when the National People's Congress approved the repeal of a constitutional article that limited presidential terms to 2 terms or 10 years. So, Xi Jinping has the opportunity to become president of China for life. Thus, Chinese socialism with the character of Xi Jinping's thought will continue. To borrow Foucault's thought that truth regimes operate when knowledge and power both endure.

The above, of course, provides good news in global politics. Where many pundits consider that socialism is dead - proven not to be true, it is gaining strength under Xi Jinping's leadership. China became a country that was lauded in terms of economic growth. In addition, policies based on Chinese socialism, can also be accepted by various countries in the world. A trade war ensued between the United States and China. This proves that the rise of China is the rise of socialism. Despite many claims confirming that liberal capitalism is still the global economic order, Xi Jinping still chooses socialism as the ideology of both Chinese and global development. In a speech released by CNSNews.Com, Xi Jinping wrote that according to Xi, "only socialism can save China." Such statements have constructed a regime of truth about socialism with Chinese character is the savior of the world. He reinforced Foucault's thinking about "the will for truth equals the will for power."

Through knowledge, power is formed, whereas through power knowledge is maintained. This immanence creates a regime of truth that constructs a new era of socialism in China and globally, namely socialism with the character of Xi Jinping. Reliable ideas in scientific discourse are built into a new paradigm in Chinese society and the international community. Chinese socialism will be the world's role model in economic development for common prosperity. The mystery of this socialism of Chinese character is what kind of ideas elevate China to be a country to be reckoned with in the contemporary era. This is the "chaos" of research, so the exploration of Xi Jinping's thoughts is the focus of research.

## METHODS

The research method used is qualitative method, this study is descriptive analytic, this is to describe and analyze the system of Islamic financial institutions with the system of conventional financial institutions. This paper will offer about the differences between Islamic financial institutions and conventional financial institutions (Creswell, 2015).

## RESULTS

### 1. Power of Hegemony

The most basic theoretical framework in this research is hegemony and populism proposed by Ernesto Laclau in a book entitled "*on populism resonia*." In *On Populist Reasonia*, he analyzes the elitist and substantially anti-democratic premises that stand behind the identification of 'the people' with the 'basic desires' that demagogues can 'zeal,' and postulates that there is a threat to contemporary democracy, but not of the restriction of minority oligarchs free from popular control. Continuing this, he proposes a conceptualization of populism that is radically different from the vague and degrading use of media.

Laclau understood the word not as a specific ideological content but as a form of articulation of popular identity – typical in times of crisis, loss of institutional capacity to absorb pressure, and pre-existing discontent and dislocation of allegiances – by way of dichotomized political space that established '*plebs*' who declared themselves to be the only legitimate 'populus' in opposition to symbolically grouped elites. New borders are thus drawn across the political battlefield, portraying the new 'them' as an opposition to which popular identities are generated that override metaphors that previously divided people. In each case, the ideological significance of populism depends on the nature and management of these borders.

This conceptualization of populism makes the Laclau category an important reference point for understanding the experience of political change, the formation of national popular governments and state reforms in Latin America at the beginning of the twenty-first century. But at the same time, it was also the cause of this 'late Laclau' being ignored or facing hostility in Spain, despite his intellectual influence and academic recognition in Latin America and elsewhere in Europe. It must be remembered that Latin America's experience of expanding democracy and social inclusion faces hostility from conservative thought and incomprehension among the majority of the Left, for which populism is a forgery – or more or less a disturbing nuisance of – existing ones. Certainty.

Moreover, in *populism and hegemony in Laclau: a genology*, he emphasized that socialist strategies should emphasize the hegemony of discourse. This is a connection between what Laclau and Mouffe proposed under the term "hegemonic politics" and the political field as a whole is still somewhat ambiguous. In the book, hegemony is described as one of the types of political possibilities, which arises with modern representative democracy. It must be borne in mind that one of the principles of hegemonic struggle, as made clear by Laclau and Mouffe on a number of occasions, is that the social order is never completely sewn by a single articulation; in other words, the concept of hegemony has always been imagined as democratically plural politics, consistent with a post-Marxist shift away from class questions to include members of society who have traditionally been excluded from leftist conventional discourse. This section will be explored to discover a discourse of Trump and Xi's populism in the fight for power hegemony in global trade that (perhaps) articulates a single truth (Hutagalung 2008, 3).

The discourse of truth we will call "depoliticization," in which people seem to accept the inevitability of their own subordination to an unjust and exploitative political economy without subordination requiring even their own consent, is repeatedly themed as a central concern in Laclau's *On Populist Reason* – in which Argentine political thinkers most clearly advocate populism as a contemporary praxis. It is worth briefly summarizing Laclau's main thesis here to put a better argument. What Laclau argues in this work is that previous studies of populism have failed to provide a convincing analysis.

According to Laclau, these scholars misrecognize the true way populism represents a particular form of politics. The momentum of populism is the political momentum *par excellence*, or as the momentum of "nation-building" – a formula that Laclau will repeat at various moments throughout the book. This "person" does not have a priori fixed identity: it is the result of an articulatory practice that stitches social meaning in chains of equality composed by fundamental antagonisms. The concept of "people" describes those who are hegemonized by Trump and Xi discourses that legitimize U.S. and Chinese foreign policy.

In addition, an important part that Laclau calls the variable "empty marker," which replaces a series of equivalence that articulates what should be an isolated demand. It is a function of empty markers, in Laclau's theory of hegemony, to try to domesticate the field of difference underlying social relations by the partial suturing ("hegemonization") of social meaning. What is special about "people" as a type of empty marker is that it supposes the division of social space into two irreducible camps of antagonists ("friend" and "enemy"). It should be clear that Laclau's exploration of populism draws heavily from the basic tools of hegemony theory, and in many ways can be claimed to be inseparable from what he and Mouffe had previously called a "popular" hegemonic struggle.

Laclau identified that specific logics are inherent in the excess of populism, and to argue that, far from being compatible with marginal phenomena, they are inscribed in the actual workings of any communitarian space. This is the logic that makes populism a political form whose job is to build up the people. We cannot understand the stakes of Laclau's argument if we do not first appreciate that this point of departure implies a critique of liberal democratic theory. One of the assumptions of liberal democratic theory lies in the idea that any social space already given in totality, in which "rational actors" or "individuals" interact with each other based on competing requests and interests. However, for Laclau, this form of conceptualization of social space is limited to the level of Ontic discourse.

The most important part to understand here is that criticism of liberal democratic theory cannot be removed from the contemporary problem we call the depoliticization of society. It is logical to state that, in Laclau's view, for ontics to manifest in populist or hegemonic momentum is first necessary, an ontological momentum that stitches social space and allows "ontics" to become possible. What exists as a social reality forms part of a number of accepted sedimentary social practices. The acceptance of these sedimentary practices always implies, to some degree, the elimination of the basic moment of social reality itself: the populist moment as the construction of the people.

The problem of contemporary politics as presented in *On Populist Reason* is a problem of ontics; the fact that contemporary liberal democracy closes the moment of violent and disruptive people-building that is part and parcel of the possibilities of modern democratic practice. Laclau's growing emphasis on populism as a political practice finds its reason in the perceived need to democratize the ontological dimension of politics that lies at the foundation of any established social identity. Only from the geometric logic of politics can one challenge the level of institutionality of "ontic" politics and revitalize the social sphere and its coordination – areas that would otherwise be accepted by liberal democratic theory as given. This distinction is expressed in Laclau's thought as the difference between ontological and ontological. Then in *On Populist Reason*, we see Laclau dismiss this distinction as one that explicitly deals with the problem of depoliticization.

In short, Laclau gives a special symbolic function to the concept of revision of hegemony or populism, which adopts a dual role. On the one hand, he suggested a form of "reactivation" of politics towards "political death" whose mode would be "people's development." It responds to a very contemporary problem that is social fragmentation depoliticized and ruled by an unlimited capitalist exploitation machine. However, the question of democracy has not disappeared altogether from Laclau's discourse in *On Populist Reason* but has been subordinated to the logic of populism, in a movement that seems to be reversed to that played out in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.

Laclau writes, for example, that "the construction of 'the people' is *sine qua non*, the functioning of democracy. One of the most important arguments presented by Laclau and Mouffe as justification for the theory of hegemony is the plurality and diversity of different demands available in situations they call democratic types. In the theory of hegemony or populism Laclau opens up the tension between democracy and populism, which is always latent. Where the preference for democratic hegemonic struggles was eventually replaced one by one for populist struggles. The concept of hegemony has never largely determined the totality of social reality, as it claims. The theoretical framework of populism and hegemony of Ernesto Laclau is used as an analytical instrument in exploring Xi Jinping's populism in the global arena. In addition,

the hegemony of antagonistic discourse will be traced to China's socialist strategy to seize power in global trade.

## 2. A Review of Xi Jinping's Glory

Joseph Fewsmith's commentary, "*Xi Jinping's Fast Start*," explains that if you look at the characterization of Hobbes' life, one might say that politics before the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress seemed cruel. But with a new party president, Xi Jinping, as many people out there tell us, he does not head a divided Standing Committee and does not confront the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), as Hu Jintao was forced to do a decade ago. What's more, as someone whose revolutionary heritage remains unquestioned, Xi has pursued his work with a conviction not seen in either predecessor, especially early in their tenures (Fewsmith 2013).

Fewsmith's argument is reinforced by Elizabeth Perry's article "*The populist dream of Chinese democracy*." This article explains the Chinese dream of "democracy" has long betrayed the understanding of populist concepts. Xi Jinping refers to this tradition of trying to realize the Chinese people who want to rule the country through their economic power. Xi's efforts are part of the Chinese Communist Party's "re-orientation" through official propaganda to showcase the glory of ancient civilizations that claim to represent world civilization. The populist interpretation of "democracy" seeks to eliminate the fundamental values and contradictions between the values of openness and liberal politics (Perry 2015).

Carl Minzner's next article, titled "*legal reform in the Xi Jinping era*," Minzner explained that the content of legal reforms that developed under Xi Jinping's administration may have more in common with current trends in party apparatus discipline or history within imperial China, than it did with the norms of the rule of law. This essay attempts to do three things: (1) analyze how and why China's legal reforms have shifted over the past two decades, (2) outline the direction of reform under Xi, and (3) sketch out institutional considerations it is likely to direct the country's efforts in the legal field over the coming years (Minzner 2015).

Salvatore Babones, in an article titled "*Xi Jinping: Communist China's first populist president*," explained that Xi Jinping at the opening of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party promised to build a beautiful China with blue skies and clean air. As Xi promised economic reforms and more responsive governance, Xi Jinping has a knack for crafting a brat-style political program (Babones 2017). Kenneth Roth, writing "*The dangerous rise of populism: Global attacks on human rights values*," says populists offer superficial answers to complex problems, but broad public siege of human rights principles at stake can be convinced to reject populists who are an unpopular minority as goats black, and their efforts to reduce oversight and balance to government abuses (Roth 2017).

Another analysis comes from Johannes Bollen Hugo Rojas Romagos' "*Trade wars: economic impacts of US tariff increases and retaliations*." The economic effects of the trade conflict stem from U.S. steel and aluminum imposing limited tariffs, with the exception of some specialized sectors. However, China's GDP suffered a temporary loss and will eventually increase to 1.2% of GDP when the US targets additional tariffs on Chinese electronic devices products and China retaliates so that a trade war between the two countries is inevitable. GDP losses for the US range at 0.3% of the lower share of total exports in GDP, and in particular, exports to the US are relatively low to China.

Negara-negara lain, termasuk UE, pada awalnya akan terpengaruh konflik perdagangan baja dan aluminium, tetapi secara tidak langsung diam-diam mendapat manfaat dari konflik perdagangan AS-Cina. Namun Keuntungan UE akan berkurang jika AS memutuskan untuk mengenakan tarif impor untuk kendaraan bermotor. Pada di tingkat sektoral, konflik perdagangan akan menyebabkan pergeseran produksi dan pekerjaan yang signifikan, terutama di AS dan Cina. Pergeseran ini menyangkut sektor-sektor seperti peralatan elektronik sektor, peralatan mesin, dan pertanian (Bollen, Johannes; Rojas-Romagos, Hugo 2018).

## 3. Xi Jinping's journey to becoming a Supreme leader

Xi Jinping officially began his rule as supreme leader of the People's Republic of China since 2013. Before assuming the official post of president, Xi had also been active as a politician and government official. He became general secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012. In addition, he was also vice president of China from 2008 to 2013. Xi Jinping has come a long way to become China's supreme leader. Xi's life history has more or less influenced his thinking, which is ultimately reflected in his model of governance over China today.

Xi Jinping is the son of Xi Zhongxun, who once served as China's vice premier and was Mao Zedong's early comrade-in-arms. Xi Jinping's father was a Communist Party elder. However, Xi Jinping's father is known to have criticized Mao's rule a lot, especially on the cultural revolution. Therefore, Xi Jinping's father fell out of favor and was even removed by Mao's party and government, so Xi Jinping was sent to the prison in 1969, where he worked as a manual laborer in an agricultural commune. He arrived in the village, in Shaanxi Province, as a teenager who got a little lost and left as a 22-year-old man determined to do something for the

people. The needs of the people weighed heavily on Xi's heart. During that period, he developed excellent relations with the local peasantry, which helped Xi's credibility within the CCP ranks. Xi once said that officials should love people the way they love their parents, work for their benefit, and lead them to prosperity. (Jinping 2014, 481)

The cultural revolution of Mao's rule has been a memorable event for Xi Jinping. As a result of these events, Xi Jinping and his family suffered from the atrocities of the Red Guards (Ekaputra, 2017). The physical suffering he endured has affected Xi Jinping's psyche. Although Xi Jinping felt suffering because of Mao's government at the time, Xi Jinping did not hate Mao, on the contrary he deepened his government. This has an impact on Xi Jinping's current personality in politics, where he chooses differently from his reformist father, Xi is more cautious of reformist actions and tends to follow the party line.

In 1974, Xi Jinping became an official party member, serving as a branch secretary, and the following year he began attending Beijing's Tsinghua University. After graduating in 1979, he worked for three years as a secretary to Geng Biao, then vice premier and minister of national defense in China's central government. In 1982 Xi relinquished the post, choosing instead to leave Beijing and work as a CCP deputy secretary in Hebei province. He stayed there until 1985, when he was appointed party committee member and deputy mayor of Xiamen in Fujian province. In 1995, Xi rose to the post of deputy provincial party secretary. In 1999, Xi became acting governor of Fujian, and then he became governor the following year. As head of Fujian, he focused his attention on environmental preservation and cooperation with nearby Taiwan. He held the post of deputy secretary and government until 2002, where he focused on restructuring the province's industrial infrastructure to promote sustainable development (Doria-Rose et al., 2021).

In 2007, Xi served as secretary of Shanghai. At the time, Xi focused on promoting stability and rehabilitating the city's financial image. However, he held the position only for a short time, as in October 2007, he was elected as one of the nine members of the standing committee of the CCP Political Bureau, the highest ruling body in the party. With the promotion, Xi was put on a shortlist of possible successors to Hu Jintao, general secretary of the CCP since 2002 and president of the People's Republic since 2003. Xi's status became even more secure when in March 2008 he was elected vice president of China. In that role he focused on conservation efforts and improving international relations. In October 2010, Xi was appointed vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, a post once held by Hu Jintao, and generally regarded as a major stepping stone to the presidency. In November 2012, during the CCP's 18th party congress, Xi was re-elected to the standing committee of the Political Bureau, and he succeeded Hu as party general secretary. On March 14, 2013, he was elected president of China by the National People's Congress (Doria-Rose et al., 2021).

Xi's long journey, from the dark times his family endured during Mao's reign, to becoming leader of the People's Republic of China today has shown how actively involved he has always been in the Chinese government. Judging from his journey to becoming China's leader, he acquired an impressive list of formal titles scattered throughout the main 'terrain' of power for China. Aside from the important positions he has occupied, and is now the country's President as well as Party general secretary, Xi is also responsible for all military matters, and heads several small groups that are core areas of party and government policy. Among the most significant is the *Small Leading Group on Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, which was formed after the CCP's Third Plenary in October 2013, then sits at the heart of the Politburo Standing Committee. With that, Xi is increasingly clearly illustrated that he is the figure who holds supreme power over China (Miller, 2008).

During his time active in the Chinese government, even before he officially took office as president, Xi Jinping has emphasized a fundamental stance in favor of the people. People's interests and lives are high on the agenda for Xi Jinping, with the government prioritizing its people because the people are the most basic foundation of a government. Xi Jinping also continues to make efforts that show his partiality to the Chinese people. Since 2012, General Secretary Xi Jinping has personally led the fight against poverty. He visited 14 adjacent poor areas and chaired 7 poverty alleviation symposia. After 8 years of hard work, 832 poor districts and 128,000 villages have been removed from the poverty list, and nearly 100 million poor rural residents have risen above the poverty line. Regional poverty as a whole and extreme poverty are now a thing of the past. (Zhiyuan 2021)

Alleviating poverty is indeed one of the most tangible manifestations of the beginning of Xi's leadership success for the progress of Chinese society. This is in line with Xi's leadership character that is very partial to the people. Xi has completed more than 30 field tours of poverty alleviation efforts over the past five years and hosted five inter-provincial meetings in locations including Fuping County in northern China's Hebei Province. China under Xi's leadership has adopted various ways to reduce poverty, namely through *e-commerce*, financing, industry, relocation and infrastructure upgrades. (Xinhuanet 2017)

With the reduction of the poverty line in China under Xi Jinping, it also hints at China's economic growth and progress. It can also be said that during the Xi Jinping era, Chinese society experienced an increase in the level of prosperity. This is evident from several exhibitions held in Beijing, which show China's development

achievements. Recent achievements of China's recent progress under Xi's rule include technological innovations such as interactive robots, advanced medical machines, and Chinese bullet train models. (Yi 2017)

In the cultural sector, China during Xi's leadership era, also emphasized belief in a culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Cultural beliefs are an important part of state sovereignty. In 2016, China produced a total of 944 films, earning *box office* revenue of 49.28 billion yuan, up from 17 billion yuan in 2012. In addition, China enacted a *cybersecurity* law in November 2016. The cybersecurity industry is also well developed, and now China has nearly 2,000 cybersecurity companies. Economically, China under Xi Jinping's rule continues to make great progress. China's domestic income increased dramatically from 54.04 trillion yuan in 2012, to 74.41 trillion yuan in 2016. Innovations that continue to be carried out have indeed boosted China's growth. China ranked 22nd in the Global Innovation Index in 2017, making it the only middle-income country to feature in the top 25. (Yi 2017)

Still in the early days of his reign as Chinese leader, great and effective movements have been made by Xi Jinping for the progress of Chinese society. Xi's charm is also increasingly evident as he quickly and skillfully completes Bo Xilai's trial, as Bo Xilai's case represents the biggest challenge to the party's legitimacy since the 1989 Tian Anmen Square incident and has been widely regarded as a dark time for the CCP leadership. The Bo Xilai scandal exposed the decadent lifestyles of some party bigwigs, including involvement with sex, drugs, money laundering, and even murder. Under Xi's rule, however, the case could have been handled wisely, with prosecutors focusing on Bo's official corruption, rather than on other unlawful or immoral behavior, thus avoiding a wider disclosure of the weaknesses of China's political system. They used social media to disseminate details of the proceedings, thereby reducing the potential for criticism over the lack of openness. In the end, Bo was sentenced to life imprisonment. So that a good image is increasingly attached to Xi Jinping as a leader who wisely managed to solve this problem. (Li 2016, 8)

Furthermore, at the beginning of his administration, Xi has achieved great success from anti-corruption efforts, which have had a major impact in creating a good environment for the government and for all Chinese people to have a more prosperous state life. The success in anti-corruption efforts in the Xi Jinping era was carried out by disciplining party members from corruption. According to statistics, disciplinary watchdogs across China have punished more than 1.4 million party members or officials since 2012. More than 280 central officials have been investigated by the *CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection* since 2012. Since leading the Party, in 2012, he has punished hundreds of thousands of Party cadres, military officers, and oligarchs. In Xi Jinping's hands, China has proven itself to be a fast-growing and developing country. These measures to clean up corruption are sure to further foster the confidence of the Chinese people in their leader to lead the Chinese government. The great and effective efforts aimed at China's own progress were a success of Xi's leadership that raised his name. (Yi 2017)

Xi Jinping has achieved unrelenting achievements in his success in leading China early in his rule. Furthermore, in late 2015 and early 2016, Xi Jinping achieved a milestone in terms of restructuring *the People's Liberation Army (PLA)*. Xi has profoundly changed the administrative makeup of the *PLA*, restructured its regional organization, and reshuffled officials across departments, regions and services. The widespread changes are aimed at paving the way for younger generations, many of whom are seen as Xi's old protégés. This massive change in the restructuring of the *PLA* actually reflects Xi Jinping's skill and courage in ruling China, which is also unique to Xi that his predecessors did not have. (Li 2016, 10)

China's foreign policy under Xi has also been a major success. Xi's Foreign Policy approach was a more "proactive" one, which represents a change from Hu Jintao's passive approach to Chinese Foreign Policy. Xi has significantly improved China's relations with South Korea, despite the huge risks. Xi has also been more active in meetings between countries, one of which was when Xi presided over an important event that defined China-Russia relations, namely the signing of a thirty-year gas deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin in 2014. Furthermore, at a conference called "*Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia*," held in Shanghai in May 2014, Xi issued a statement implying China's readiness to play a role in addressing regional affairs. In this regard, he said "Asian affairs should be decided by Asians, and Asian security should be protected by Asian countries". (Li 2016, 10)

Xi Jinping's image as a good leader for China is increasingly evident in his determination to reform and revitalize the Chinese economy. Xi has championed his vision of the "*Chinese Dream*" which aims at the rejuvenation of the nation and opening up opportunities for all Chinese to achieve a 'middle-class' lifestyle. As is evident from the Third Plenary of the 18th Central Committee, held in November 2013, the overall goal of Xi's economic policy is to make the private sector the driving force of the Chinese economy, that is, to satisfy the desires of the Chinese middle class, and to enable more members of the lower class to achieve middle class status. Xi has taken unpopular but highly effective measures to ease China's financial and economic problems. (Li 2016, 11)

From what has been written above, the initial successes that the Xi government has made include, among others, that it succeeded in lifting Chinese society out of poverty in effective ways; Fight corruption by

punishing more than one million party members; Support and develop technology-based innovations for the development of the country's progress; Solving Bo Xilai's dramatic scandal; The urgency of military reform; A more proactive change in the direction of Foreign Policy; Revitalize China's economy in the vision of the "Chinese Dream." What has been mentioned above is a small part of the achievements of Xi Jinping's government from many other successes. However, some of the achievements of the Xi government mentioned above are enough to show the persistence of the Xi government in making major and rapid changes for the progress of Chinese society.

In addition to Xi's many achievements in advancing China, as mentioned earlier, Xi also held important positions in the government, namely as president, party secretary, and chairman of the Central Military Commission (KMP) of China, as well as other important and crucial positions in the Chinese government. It can be argued that Xi has quickly consolidated his personal power as China's leader, and subtly Xi Jinping has changed the way his country is governed, namely with himself as the core or center of China's progress (McDonnell, 2018). Xi's leadership of China shows that China has undergone a change from collective leadership to *personalistic dictatorship* (Shirk, 2018). Xi has indeed hinted clearly at signs of his authority and power. That is by obtaining an impressive list of formal titles in key positions of power in China, and supported by his great and effective successes in advancing China early in his reign. Xi Jinping's name continues to shine as a supreme leader who is increasingly respected by the Chinese people. It's no surprise that since the beginning of Xi's leadership over China, he has been touted as the most powerful leader the country has had since the Deng Xiaoping era. In fact, some claim power equal to that of the regime's founder Mao Zedong (Fauzi, n.d.) .

Xi had success with anti-corruption efforts at the start of his rule, The National People's Congress amended the constitution to abolish presidential term limits (Chafid & Erliyana, 2021). That allowed Xi Jinping to retain power indefinitely. The term of office that was supposed to be only valid for 10 years, was later revoked to life. Historically, due to Deng Xiaoping's rule which was considered dangerous to "one-man" rule and personality cults to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, then after Deng Xiaoping's rule, and after Mao's death, it was written into the Chinese constitution about the five-year limit of presidential terms with a maximum of two terms. Since then, the Chinese president has a term limit (Chrisnandi, 2019). However, today China under Xi Jinping's rule has removed presidential term limits from its constitution. This gives President Xi the right to remain in office indefinitely. The Chinese Communist Party had proposed the amendment, which was then passed quickly because parliament was filled with loyal party members and would not oppose the proposal. Only two "no" votes were cast, with three abstentions, out of nearly 3,000 delegates (Aaron, 2022). The decision also has not led to a national debate against the discourse of "indefinite presidential leadership." What Xi has done since the beginning of his administration has established him as a strong and ideal leader for China's progress, so that a national debate about the abolished presidential term did not arise in society during Xi Jinping's tenure.

Xi Jinping's alacrity for all his successes and efforts in favor of the people, not only adds to his confidence as an ideal leader, but also implies a guarantee of great support from China's veteran leaders, as well as the Chinese people (Maya, 2022). Starting with his activity in the government by holding several positions at once, as well as being in important and crucial positions in the government (Sholikin, 2020); achieving successes in efforts to bring China to grow more prosperous from the beginning of his leadership; to the potential for indefinite tenure.

With China's current progress, the state has proven itself capable of ruling there, from there the people increasingly entrust that the state is its only intellectual resource, so that a deep love for the figure of the country arises, so if that love has arisen and grown, the people tend to support and accept whatever the country's decision is. Where it can be one of the reasons the government is becoming stronger in the eyes of the people. In this case it is the Chinese people to Xi Jinping's government. With this, it can be said that Xi's leadership has been in power influencing the Chinese people so that he has great support.

#### **4. Xi Jinping-era socialism discourse**

What is seen on the surface of Xi's success in advancing Chinese society has, very sweetly, succeeded in making the Chinese people look at Xi as an ideal leader. This could indicate that Xi has played the populist card. To take a deeper look at Xi Jinping's role in playing the populist card and ruling over the Chinese people, it is necessary to know the characteristics of his leadership over Chinese society. Being the leader of the Chinese people is not an easy burden, with the character of China that is very centered on the government, coupled with its vast geographical situation, and is the country with the number one population in the world.

However, Xi Jinping as the leader of the Chinese people has proven successful in dominating China's domestic political agenda since the beginning of his rule in 2012, so it is hard to resist the idea that there is some belief about China's rise in his hands. Xi Jinping's leadership of China became a special era for China's progress, where Xi Jinping managed to give its own color to the image of an increasingly advanced China.

Core socialist values characterised Xi Jinping's China. China has been under socialist rule for nearly a decade, but Xi Jinping has shown his distinctive socialist characteristics in his political programs. "Only socialism can *save China*," Xi wrote in his explanatory note to the Third Plenary statement, further concluding that only reform and opening up can develop China, socialism, and Marxism. (Jinping 2014, 77)

At the beginning of his reign, Xi Jinping initiated a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, from which thousands of high and low-ranking officials were dismissed. Xi also stressed the importance of the rule of law, calling for adherence to China's constitution and greater professionalization of the judiciary as a means to develop "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Under Xi's leadership, China has become increasingly active in international affairs, one of which is insisting on its territorial sovereignty claims over almost all of the South China Sea, as well as promoting initiatives such as the *Belt Initiative* for joint trade, infrastructure and development projects with East Asian, Central Asian and European countries.

Further, under Xi's leadership, the CCP is building a narrative of law-based governance as an instrument that helps legitimize China's modernization and development. Despite China's phenomenal economic growth, which may indicate that China is liberalizing on a large scale, the concept of Leninist democratic centralism still highlights the country's process of economic growth. The CCP's internal practices are guided by democratic centralism. For China, party unity and authority remain central in all economic reforms (Garrick & Bennett, 2018).

Hu and Xi have focused on how to manage the relationship between government and markets, as evidenced by the growing prominence of the non-state sector throughout the 2000s. In 2012, more than half of GDP came from non-state entities. They began to send more investments abroad, that is, innovative Chinese companies. That way more and more people can work. Therefore, the Hu and Xi era was an era in which the party was not the only source that could determine where GDP growth came from. In the Xi era, he expressed a new vision of the relationship between government and economy. Namely that the main responsibilities and roles of the government are to maintain macroeconomic stability, strengthen and improve public services, ensure healthy competition, strengthen market supervision, maintain market order, promote sustainable development, and common welfare, and intervene in situations where market failures occur. So market preference and openness characterize Xi's socialist ideology in advancing China, so that all his policies and political programs flow from this ideological basis (Jinping 2014, 85)(Brown, 2016). The new era of Xi Jinping's socialist thought, rooted in the great practice of Chinese economic construction, systematic interpretation of China's economic reform and development.

As Xi Jinping is officially elected president of China, China's national legislature has adopted constitutional amendments to enshrine Xi Jinping's thoughts on Socialism with distinctively Chinese characteristics. It is the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and encapsulates the practical experience and collective wisdom of the CCP and its people. The Chinese Communist Party announced the formation of thought for the first time at its 19th National Congress in October 2017 and wrote the thought into the Party Constitution as a new guide. Basically, Xi is committed to returning China to its former glory by building socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua 2018)(Liu, 2018). He is well aware of weaknesses in the political system, which make him potentially vulnerable. Xi exudes great confidence in China's political system and its prospects. For him, this system requires a good overhaul and strong leadership to serve as an effective engine of government that delivers the national awakening to which he is committed. The system he inherited was the Leninist consultative system, formed under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The focus of reform in the political arena is to strengthen this system, not replace it with an alternative system such as liberal democracy or with the restoration of Maoist totalitarianism or with dictatorships. So Xi Jinping's leadership has its own characteristics. (Yu 2013)

The socialist character of China in the Xi Jinping era is reflected through the implementation of its policies and political programs. As mentioned, it seems clear that Xi is aiming for market growth, one of which is by developing a mixed-ownership economy. It is a reform Xi has pursued to counter one of the biggest obstacles to China's growth, which is how state-owned enterprises have long been ruled by a network of parasites that have extorted state treasures for personal gain. Because SOEs are very important to the Party state because of their role in managing personal taxation, non-state taxes, as well as foreign companies, Xi is committed to improving the country's asset management system. So, the market is the most powerful means to target cancer in the heart of SOEs. (Jinping 2014, 86)

Through his openness embodied in his distinctive leadership characteristic values, Xi has also led China's urban renaissance. China is a country dominated by rural areas. Until the 1990s, more than 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas. But today, under Xi's leadership, China has rapidly transformed into a modern city-state. This is one side of the economic openness of the Xi government, where later by transforming China which was once mostly rural areas into more developed urban areas, consumption and services that affect GDP will increase. Where a new type of citizen will appear, who owns a house and pays taxes. (Brown 2016, 161-162)



Furthermore, by the time Xi took up the party mantle in 2012 as General Secretary, communist orthodoxy had returned to the party and its cadres systematically (Amin, 2016). Xi has underlined the importance of Maoist-Leninist ideology to the party's 92 million members. Not only were students forced to study party history and ideology compulsorily, a secret memo was issued banning the teaching of Western concepts such as constitutional democracy, and human rights at the school level. Such control and ideological indoctrination has been extended to private enterprises as well by issuing guidelines and opening party cells within them. Businessmen and *start-up* funders like Jack Ma are key members of the party. However, Xi has systematically destroyed the central tenets of collectivist communism by making himself supreme leader and controlling all levers of power. Plus, he has pushed the party and its cadres down a nationalistic path. For example, Xi in 2017 urged his people that it was time for China to take global leadership and demonstrate its unique economic model, saying, "the evolving economic model of socialism with Chinese characteristics offers a new option to the world." (Sahoo 2021)

**5. Regional Hegemonic Power Strategy**

The slogan of China's peaceful awakening under Xi Jinping through the *belt and road initiative* (BRI) program frames the discus of cultural power (see table 1), so that China's image shifts to "not a threat." Through the BRI policy, China can expand to various regions in the world, so that even though the claim of global hegemony is still in the hands of the United States, one of the regional hegemonic powers can be argued, one of which is China. In reality, China's approach to conducting international relations in the region is a model of economic and investment regulation, so it has low international political sensitivity.

**Tabel 1. Strategi Penguasaan Ekonomi dalam Kerangka BRI**

STATE	REGION	INCOME CATEGORY
Afganistan	Asia Selatan	Low income
Albania	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Aljazair	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Upper middle income
Angola	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Antigua dan Barbuda	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Armenia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Austria*	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Azerbaijan	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Bahrain	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Bangladesh	Asia Selatan	Lower middle income
Barbados	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Belarus	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Benin *	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Bolivia	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Lower middle income
Bosnia dan Herzegovina	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Brunei Darussalam	Asia Timur & Pasifik	High income
Bulgaria	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Burundi	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Cabo Verde	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Kamboja	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Kamerun	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Chad	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Chili	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Cina	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Kepulauan Cook	Asia Timur & Pasifik	
Komoro *	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Kongo, Rep. *	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Kuba	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Siprus	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Republik Ceko	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Djibouti	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Lower middle income
Dominica *	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Ekuador	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Mesir, Republik Arab	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Lower middle income
El Salvador	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Lower middle income
Guinea ekuator	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Upper middle income

Estonia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Etiopia	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Fiji	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Gabon	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Upper middle income
Gambia, The	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Georgia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Lower middle income
Ghana	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Yunani	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Grenada	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Guinea	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Guyana	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Hungaria	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Indonesia	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Iran, Republik Islam	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Upper middle income
Irak	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Upper middle income
Italia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Jamaika	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Kuwait	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Republik Kirgistan	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Lower middle income
Lao PDR	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Latvia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Libanon	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Upper middle income
Lesotho	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Liberia	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Libya	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Upper middle income
Lithuania	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Luksemburg	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Madagaskar	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Malaysia	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Maladewa	Asia Selatan	Upper middle income
Mali	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Malta	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Mauritania	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Mikronesia, The Fed. Sts.	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Moldova	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Lower middle income
Mongolia	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Montenegro	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Maroko	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Lower middle income
Mozambik	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Myanmar	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Namibia	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Upper middle income
Nepal	Asia Selatan	Low income
Selandia Baru	Asia Timur & Pasifik	High income
Niger *	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Nigeria	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Niue	Asia Timur & Pasifik	-
Makedonia Utara	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Oman	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Pakistan	Asia Selatan	Lower middle income
Panama	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Papua Nugini	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Peru	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Filipina	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Polandia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Portugal	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Qatar	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Rumania	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income

Federasi Rusia*	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Rwanda	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Samoa	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Arab Saudi	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Senegal	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Serbia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Seychelles	Sub-Sahara Afrika	High income
Sierra Leone	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Singapura	Asia Timur & Pasifik	High income
Republik Slovakia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Slovenia	Eropa & Asia Tengah	High income
Pulau Solomon	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Somalia	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Afrika Selatan	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Upper middle income
Sudan Selatan	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Srilanka	Asia Selatan	Lower middle income
Sudan	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Suriname	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Tajikistan	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Low income
Tanzania	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Thailand	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Timor-Leste	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Togo	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Tonga	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Upper middle income
Trinidad dan Tobago	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Tunisia	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Lower middle income
Turki	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Upper middle income
Uganda	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income
Ukraina	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Lower middle income
Uni Emirat Arab	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	High income
Uruguay	Amerika Latin & Karibia	High income
Uzbekistan	Eropa & Asia Tengah	Lower middle income
Vanuatu	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Venezuela, RB	Amerika Latin & Karibia	Upper middle income
Vietnam	Asia Timur & Pasifik	Lower middle income
Yaman, Rep.	Timur Tengah & Afrika Utara	Low income
Zambia	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Lower middle income
Zimbabwe	Sub-Sahara Afrika	Low income

Sumber: <https://green-bri.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri>

Table 1 data above shows China's control under Xi Jinping through the BRI framework. At first glance, the data can be argued that Xi Jinping's power is spreading throughout the world. Xi is pursuing a strategy to seize *super power* status. However, this argument was decided too quickly by looking only at countries within the BRI framework. We can look again at the BRI project in the global arena (see table 2).

**Table 2. Towards World Power Through BRI Project**

Project	State	Type
Padma Rail Link	Bangladesh	Energy
<a href="#">Lower Sesan Two Hydropower Dam</a>	Kamboja	Energy
<a href="#">Pipa gas Asia Tengah - Cina</a>	Berganda	Tranport
<a href="#">Port Multiguna Doraleh</a>	Djibouti	Transport
Eropa-Cina - Rail Link I & II	Berganda	Transport
<a href="#">Khorgos Gateway Dry Port</a>	Kasakhstan	Transport
Mombasa Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway SGR	Kenya	Urban
<a href="#">Hutan Kota</a>	Malaysia	Urban

<a href="#">Gerbang Melaka</a>	Malaysia	ICT
<a href="#">Pakistan-Cina - Proyek Serat Optik</a>	Berganda	Energy
<a href="#">Bendungan Diamer-Bhasha</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Pelabuhan Gwadar</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Engro Itu Pembangkit Listrik Blok II</a>	Pakistan	Transport
Beograd-Montenegro Bar Port Motorway	Serbia	Transport
Sino-Thai - Kereta Api Berkecepatan Tinggi	Berganda	Transport
<a href="#">Colombo South Harbour</a>	Srilanka	Urban
<a href="#">Port City Colombo</a>	Srilanka	Transport
Pelabuhan Hambantota	Srilanka	Transport
Single Trans-Asian Railway	Berganda	Energy
<a href="#">Proyek PLTA Karuma</a>	Uganda	Transport
<a href="#">Pap Angren Railway</a>	Uzbekistan	Transport
<a href="#">Budapest – Belgrade Railway</a>	Berganda	Energy
<a href="#">Proyek LNG Yamal</a>	Rusia	Transport
Kereta Api Tehran-Mashhad	Iran	Transport
<a href="#">Lagos-Calabar Railway</a>	Nigeria	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api Lagos-Kano</a>	Nigeria	Transport
Kereta Api Chad-Kamerun & Chad-Sudan	Chad	Transport
Abuja Rail Mass Transit Tahap II	Nigeria	Transport
<a href="#">Addis Ababa Light Rail</a>	Etopia	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api Benguela</a>	Angola	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api Abuja-Kaduna</a>	Nigeria	Transport
Kereta Api Khartoum-Port Sudan	Sudan	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api Djibouti-Ethiopia</a>	Berganda	Transport
<a href="#">Vientane-Boten Railway</a>	Laos	Transport
Kereta Api Savannakhet-Lao Bao	Laos	Transport
Kereta Api Bangkok-Nong Khai	Thailand	Transport
Kereta Api Bangkok-Chiang Mai	Thailand	Transport
Kuala Lumpur-Singapura Rel Berkecepatan Tinggi	Berganda	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api Jakarta-Bandung</a>	Indonesia	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Api East Coast</a>	Malaysia	Transport
<a href="#">Kereta Gemas-Johor Bahru</a>	Malaysia	Transport
<a href="#">Port Dawei</a>	Myanmar	Transport
Proyek Gujarat Rural Roads (MMGSY)	India	Energy
Proyek Rehabilitasi PLTA Nurek, Fase I	Tajikistan	Transport
Proyek Jalan Bypass Batumi	Georgia	Energy
Proyek Gas Bumi	Bangladesh	Energy

Proyek Pipa Gas Alam Trans Anatolia	Azerbaijan	Transport
Terminal Komersial Port Duqm dan Zona Operasional	Oman	Energy
Proyek Penyuluhan PLTA Tarbela 5	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Jalan raya M4</a>	Pakistan	Transport
Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement	Tajikistan	Transport
<a href="#">Nenskra Hydropower Plant</a>	Georgia	Energy
Amaravati Sustainable Capital City	India	Urban
Madhya Pradesh Rural Connectivity Project	India	Transport
Mumbai Metro Line 4	India	Transport
Gulshat 40 MW PV Solar Power Plant	Kazakhstan	Energy
<a href="#">Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal-fired Power Plant</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Hydro China Dawood 50MW Wind Farm</a>	Pakistan	Energy
UEP 100MW Wind Farm	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Sachal 50MW Wind Farm</a>	Pakistan	Energy
Thar Mine Mouth Oracle Power Plant	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Peshawar-Karachi Motorway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
Havelian Dry Port	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Gwadar International Airport</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Myitsone Dam</a>	Myanmar	Energy
<a href="#">Balloki Power Plant</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Gadani Power Project</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Hakla-Dera Ismail Khan Motorway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Khunjerab Railway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">M5 Motorway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">M8 Motorway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Matiari-Lahore Transmission Line</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Orange Line Lahore Metro</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Pak-China Technical and Vocational Institute</a>	Pakistan	Education
<a href="#">Pakistan Port Qasim Power Project</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Karakoram Highway</a>	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Sahiwal Coal Power Project</a>	Pakistan	Energy
<a href="#">Suki Kinari Hydropower Project</a>	Pakistan	Energy
Nigcomsat Satellites	Nigeria	Space
<a href="#">MNC Lido City</a>	Indonesia	Tourism
Harare Airport Expansion	Zimbabwe	Transport
Gilgit KIU Hydropower	Pakistan	Energy
Cacho 50MW Wind Power Project	Pakistan	Energy
Haifa Port	Israel	Transport

Port of Piraeus	Greece	Transport
<a href="#">Kumport Terminal</a>	Turkey	Transport
<a href="#">Suez Canal Economic Zone</a>	Egypt	SEZ
Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Tanker Port	Myanmar	Transport
<a href="#">Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone</a>	Myanmar	Transport
<a href="#">Port Aktau</a>	Kazakhstan	Transport
<a href="#">"Khorqos – Eastern Gate"</a>	Kazakhstan	SEZ
<a href="#">Khalifa Port Terminal 2</a>	UAE	Transport
Greater Peshawar Region Mass Transit	Pakistan	Transport
Dhaka-Chattogram Rail Route	Bangladesh	Transport
Kuala Tanjung Port	Indonesia	Transport
Kayan River Hydropower Plant	Indonesia	Energy
Lake Toba Tourism District	Indonesia	Urban
International Airport Lembeh	Indonesia	Transport
Dammam Riyadh Freight Line	Saudi Arabia	Transport
Hassyan Clean Coal Project, Dubai	UAE	Energy
Muse-Mandalay Railway	Myanmar	Transport
Rahimyar Khan Power Plant	Pakistan	Energy
Kohala Hydel Project	Pakistan	Energy
Phandar Hydropower Station	Pakistan	Energy
Karachi Circular Railway	Pakistan	Transport
Greater Peshawar Mass Transit	Pakistan	Transport
Quetta Mass Transit	Pakistan	Transport
Keti BUnder Sea Port Project	Pakistan	Transport
<a href="#">Rashakai Economic Zone</a>	Pakistan	SEZ
<a href="#">China Special Economic Zone Dhabaji</a>	Pakistan	SEZ
Bostan Industrial Zone	Pakistan	SEZ
Allama Iqbal Industrial City	Pakistan	SEZ
ICT Model Industrial Zone	Pakistan	SEZ
Mirpur Special Economic Zone	Pakistan	SEZ
Mohmand Marble City	Pakistan	SEZ
Moqpondass Special Economic Zone	Pakistan	SEZ
<a href="#">Bar-Boljare Motorway (Section of European Motorway XI)</a>	Montenegro	Transport

Sumber : <https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/projects/>

A form of hegemonic power that has strong ties to populist elite discourse and figures is evident to operate on Xi Jinping. Through the discourse of peaceful development as the basis of Xi's foreign policy, through the BRI framework succeeded in bringing China into the constellation of competitive international political economy. Through Xi, China's rise as a socialist country is gaining global attention. This signifies that the unipolar system of the United States is no longer the dominant discourse, but through the rise of China, the international system has become multipolar.

## CONCLUSION

The strategy of economic domination through BRI portrays China positively in various regions. Image is an implication of the hegemony of discourse. It is an instrument institutionalized through China's peaceful development discourse. The BRI project succeeded in bringing China to a global power. So, Xi's regime is called a new era of Chinese socialism, where there is a normalization of China's peaceful development policy, which is different from previous leaders. China under Xi initiated development based on the values of Confucianism, namely harmonization. Such harmonization local discourse has consequences for peaceful foreign policy. Peaceful development is China's significant power relations in carrying out economic expansions in various regions.

In reality, China's peaceful development and the new era of Chinese socialism are driven by Xi's populism in the eyes of the Chinese and Global people. This strengthens China in achieving power interests in various regions. The results of this research do not rush to conclude that the hegemony of the United States has been replaced by China, but this research concludes that China succeeded in carrying out hegemony of peaceful development discourse in various regions within the framework of the BRI through the elite figure of populism, namely Xi Jinping.

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