

# The Public's Perception of the Operating Standards of the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF): A Quantitative Inquiry

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## Keywords

Jamaica Defense Force, Operating Standards, JDF, Police Constabulary Force

## ABSTRACT

*This study seeks to evaluate and explore the JDF from an operational standpoint. The Operations Management Theory (OMT) is used to examine whether the public's perception of the operating standards of the JDF has changed in the last decade (2012 -2022). Methods and materials: This research employed a national cross-sectional web-based descriptive research design. Data collection occurred from July 13, 2022, to August 11, 2022. Using the 2019 population of Jamaica obtained from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, with a 3.4% margin of error and 95% confidence interval, the calculated sample size is 831 resident Jamaicans. The response rate was 82.1% (n=762). Findings: The majority of the sampled respondents were Jamaicans (97.1%, n=766), resided in Jamaica (88.9%, n=700), females (59.6%, n=472), and resided in Manchester (19.2%, 150). Of the Jamaicans (n=764), 89.3% (n=682) of them reside in Jamaica compared to 10.7% (n=82) reside outside. Furthermore, 89.3% of Jamaicans resided in Jamaica compared to 77.3% of non-Jamaicans ( $\chi^2 (1) = 3.125, P = 0.077$ ). The findings indicate that people have lost respect for the JDF in the last 6 months. Conclusion: Despite the traditional military structure of the Jamaica Defense Force, the organization has been deployed on the streets of Jamaica by political administrations to curb and remedy the difficulty of policing society, and this explains a justification for a public assessment of this organization. The public is indecisive on whether the Jamaica Defense Force is too frequently used jointly with the Police Constabulary Force to police the streets of Jamaica as well as being neutral on the overall operating standards of the organization.*

## INTRODUCTION

National security and sovereignty are fundamental principles of all democratic societies (Naidu, 2002). The military plays a crucial part of the safeguarding the sovereignty, national security, and democracy of a nation (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2008; Pereira, 2022; Public Broadcasting Services (PBS), 1984). The military constitutes the air force, army, navy, space Paul

Andrew Bourne, Caroline McLean, Vincent M.S. Peterkin, James Fallah, Clifton Foster force, marine, and coast guard, primarily protecting a state's interest from external armed threats. Historically, leaders have also employed the military to secure political independence or sovereignty through warfare (Mark, 2009). According to Jordan et al. (2016), modern warfare explains a rationale for the military in nations, including small states like Jamaica.

The military branch responsible for safeguarding Jamaica's national security and sovereignty is the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) (Ministry of Justice, 2014). The JDF constitutes the army, air wing, and coast guard (The Ministry of National Security, nd). The JDF's establishment dates back to 1962 when it was formed from the West India Regiment (WIR), a British colonial regiment with roots tracing back to 1795 when the first West India Regiment was formed in the Windward Islands of the Eastern Caribbean (Jamaica Defense Force, 2021a; National Army Museum, nd). The JDF was formed just a few days before Jamaica became a sovereign independent State within the Commonwealth of Nations. Despite its relatively young age, JDF has a long history of descent and traditions stemming from units raised in the West Indies since the mid-seventeenth century, succinctly summarized in the current study.

Its original predecessor was the ancient Jamaica Militia of 1662, the immediate successor to Oliver Cromwell's troops that had taken Jamaica from the Spaniards a mere seven years earlier. In 1694, during one of two only invasions of Jamaica apart from the English invasion of 1655, the French landed a force of over 1,400 men at Carlisle Bay in southern Clarendon (Jamaica Defence Force, nd). They were met by militiamen, initially, only around 250, who alone – without support from any naval or regular army units – repulsed the French with about 100 men killed or wounded, while French losses were between 150 and 350.

By revamping the Joint/Division headquarters and creating five Brigade (Bde) formations, the JDF's current structure reflects the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) "standard combined arms Division structure". The five (Bde) formations consist of four Regular Force (The Jamaica Regiment (JCA Regt), the Maritime, Air and Cyber Command (MACC), the Support Brigade (Sp Bde) and the Caribbean Military Academy (CMA)) in addition to an expanded Jamaica National Reserve (JNR). Furthermore, these formations provide all "operational oversight and management of the Force's capabilities in the land, air, sea and cyber domains". This structure aims to ensure "a greater focus by the Chief of Defense Staff and the Joint staff on matters of strategic importance to the Force, both nationally and regionally.

The Jamaica Defense Force participated in the US-led invasion of Grenada in October 1983 (Ganase, 2014; Ledgister, 2019) and has engaged in many national states of emergency in Jamaica and performed joint police-military operations with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF, nd). The Jamaican government has been twinning the military with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) to address high rates of crimes in society. Those joint military-police operations have led to frequent interaction between military and Jamaicans citizen. The joint police- military operations have led to frequent interactions between the military and Jamaican citizens. The question arises: How do the people view this new reality? Do Jamaicans believe that in keeping with current realities, the JDF should be more accountable to the people?

There is a change in the operational reality of the JDF. The new engagement, however, does not have any empirical findings, particularly relating to the views of Jamaicans on the matter. The aforementioned issue is the rationale for the current study. Hence, this study seeks to evaluate whether the public's perception of the operating standards of the JDF has changed in the last decade (i.e., 2012-2022). Furthermore, the current study also will assess Jamaicans' perception of the JDF accountability to the citizenry and provide a framework of what Jamaicans perceive as the ideal JDF.

Understanding the public's perception of the operational standards of the JDF and whether this perception has changed in the last decade will provide some context for understanding the effectiveness or otherwise of the joint police-military operations. An important issue not examined in the literature is the public's trust in the JDF and its possible erosion in the last decade. Given that the military provides a service to society, so trust between military and the citizenry is crucial for operations to be successful. Trust, long established in the literature, is paramount for social solidarity. Research trends indicate that the interest in trust among customers has shifted to a more "relationship-based service orientation" (Isaeva et al., 2020). Customers' trust is a cornerstone of the service industry.

Research demonstrates that the quality of service in the service industry is evident in the customers' response. Customers tend to be loyal and supportive when they feel valued. The relationship

between this industry and its customers should be based on trust, commitment, and collaboration, resulting in mutual satisfaction among both parties (Isaeva et al., 2020). Since the military is a part of the service industry and provides service to a country and its citizens, it is crucial to understand its operational standards. To further evaluate and explore the JDF from an operational standpoint, the Operations Management Theory (OMT) is used to examine whether the public's perception of the operating standards of the JDF has changed in the last decade (i.e., 2012-2022).

Using a theory in this study provides a framework for understanding the relationship between phenomena (Taylor, 1911; Walker et al., 2015). The focus of this study has practical relevance to the current operating procedures of the JDF. The Operations Management Theory (OMT) helps to explain whether a company's practice leads to efficiency in production or services. In general terms of operations, management pertains to efficient management of "production process and business operations". Operations management involves the efficient administration of a business' resources and meeting the customers' needs with the highest quality while maintaining "economic viability" (MCclay, 2021).

The OMT addresses company strategies for operational and production interventions aims to increase operations and production efficiency (Taylor, 1911). Furthermore, the key to these efficiencies is utilizing resources to meet customer needs while minimizing costs. Another essential aspect is leveraging labor and raw materials by efficiently using resources to produce goods and services. OMT extends to modern operations management by promoting four fundamental theories: business process redesign (BPR), six sigma, lean manufacturing, and reconfigurable manufacturing systems. According to Taylor (1911) in "The Principles of Scientific Management", there are four specific elements: the development of "a true science of management, scientific selection of an effective and efficient worker, education and development of workers, and intimate cooperation between management and staff". OMT serves as an appropriate theory to understand further the public's perception of the operating standards of the JDF.

## **METHODS**

A national cross-sectional web-based descriptive research design was employed for the current study. The data was collected from July 13, 2022, to August 11, 2022. Using the 2019 population of Jamaica (Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 2019; i.e., 2,734,092), a 3.4% margin of error, and 95% confidence interval; the calculated sample size is 831 resident Jamaicans. Of the prospective sampled resident Jamaicans (n=831), the response rate was 82.1% (n=762). The research team collected data from people across the 14 parishes of Jamaica (see Table 1). In addition, the researchers equally sought the views of non-resident Jamaicans and individuals of other nationalities living in Jamaica at the time of the data collection. The study garnered the opinions of 82 non-resident Jamaicans and 87 non-Jamaicans who were living in the country during the data collection period. Social media platforms, particularly Facebook, were used for data collection from these groups.

The instrument was developed and designed by Paul Andrew Bourne, with assistance from Vincent M.S. Peterkin. It was a standardized instrument of fourteen (14) questions (i.e., 13 close-ended items; one open-ended item, along with six demographic items – Annex 1). Researchers sent the instrument to scholars from various field to provide feedback on the questionnaire's appropriateness, relevance, and quality. The researchers then incorporated their feedback into the Survey, and then the approved version of questionnaire was formatted using Survey Monkey.

Paul Andrew Bourne, Caroline McLean, Vincent M.S. Peterkin, James Fallah, Clifton Foster Seven Likert-scale items were designed to evaluate the operating standards of the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) over five specific periods (i.e., ½ year, 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, and 10 years). The Likert scale ranged from strongly disagree (coded as 1), disagree (coded as 2), neutral (coded as 3), agree (coded as 4), and strongly agree (coded as 5). Researchers conducted reliability analysis for this study on the 7-item questions, with a threshold value of 0.7 indicating good reliability. Negative questions were reverse coded. Specifically, items 2 (i.e., the operating standards of the JDF have fallen), 4 (i.e., Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers), 6 (i.e., I am afraid of soldiers), and 7 (i.e., I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public) were reverse-coded to ensure consistency in the response scale. In addition, confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine the validity of the 7-item Likert scale questions for assessing the operating standards of the JDF (see Annex 2). In addition, items

that have a commonality of less than 0.5 were excluded from construction of the operating standard index.

**RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

**Result**

Table 1 presents the selected demographic characteristics of the sampled respondents. Of the sampled respondents (n=792), the response rates were 99.9% (n=791) for gender, 99.6% (n=789) for nationality, 99.4% (n=787) for resident Jamaican, and 98.3% (n=780) for parish of residence in Jamaica. The findings revealed that the majority of the sampled respondents were Jamaicans (97.1%, n=766), resided in Jamaica (88.9%, n=700), female (59.6%, n=472), and resided in Manchester (19.2%, n=150).

**Table 1**  
**Demographic Characteristics of Sampled Respondents, n=792**

<b>Details</b>	<b>Total, % (n)</b>
<b>Nationality</b>	
Jamaican	97.1 (766)
Other	2.9 (23)
<b>Residential status</b>	
In Jamaica	88.9 (700)
Outside of Jamaica	11.1 (87)
<b>Gender</b>	
Male	39.6 (313)
Female	59.6 (472)
Non-binary	0.8 (6)
<b>Parish of residence</b>	
Kingston	6.8 (53)
St. Andrew	6.0 (47)
St. Thomas	2.3 (18)
Portland	5.4 (42)
St. Mary	1.9 (15)
St. Ann	5.0 (39)
Trelawny	2.1 (16)
St. James	5.0 (39)
Hanover	3.3 (26)
Westmoreland	3.8 (30)
St. Elizabeth	13.7 (107)
Manchester	19.2 (150)
Clarendon	10.1 (79)
St. Catherine	8.8 (69)
Not Applicable (i.e., outside of Jamaica)	6.4 (50)

Table 2 presents a cross-tabulation between the nationality and residential status of the sampled respondents. Of the Jamaicans (n=764), 89.3% (n=682) resided in Jamaica compared to 10.7% (n=82) who resided outside of Jamaica. Furthermore, 89.3% of Jamaicans resided in Jamaica compared to 77.3% of non-Jamaicans ( $\chi^2 (1) = 3.125, P = 0.077$ ).

**Table 2**  
**A cross-tabulation between Nationality and Resident Jamaican**

<b>Details</b>	<b>Nationality</b>		<b>Total % (N)</b>
	<b>Jamaican % (n)</b>	<b>Other % (n)</b>	

Residential status	89.3 (682)	77.3 (17)	88.9 (699)
Inside Jamaica	10.7 (82)	22.7 (5)	11.1 (87)
Outside Jamaica	764	22	786

Of the sampled respondents, 19.1% (n=151) indicated that they have had run-ins (accused, detained, or arrested) with the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) and 12.2% (n=96) with the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)-(Table 3).

**Table 3**  
**Run-ins (being accused, detained, or arrested) with the Law in Jamaica, n=**

Details	Total	
	%	(n)
<b>Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)</b>		
Yes	19.1	(151)
No	80.9	(638)
<b>Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)</b>		
Yes	12.2	(96)
No	87.8	(694)

Table 4 presents cross-tabulation between those who have had run-ins (being accused, detained, or arrested) with the JCF and Area of Residence in Jamaica. The findings revealed a significant statistical relationship between the two aforementioned variables ( $\chi^2 (14) = 33.605, P = 0.002$ ).

**Table 4**  
**A cross-Tabulation between Those Who Have Had Run-Ins (Being Accused, Detained, or Arrested) with the JCF and Area of Residence in Jamaica**

Details	Run-ins		Total, % (n)
	Yes	No	% (n)
	% (n)	% (n)	
Parish of residence			
Kingston	7.3 (11)	6.7 (42)	6.8 (53)
St. Andrew	5.3 (8)	6.2 (39)	6.0 (47)
St. Thomas	4.6 (7)	1.8 (11)	2.3 (18)
Portland	8.6 (13)	4.6 (29)	5.4 (42)
St. Mary	1.3 (2)	2.1 (13)	1.9 (15)
St. Ann	4.0 (6)	5.3 (33)	5.0 (39)
Trelawny	1.3 (2)	2.2 (14)	2.1 (16)
St. James	6.0 (9)	4.8 (30)	5.0 (39)
Hanover	5.3 (8)	2.9 (18)	3.3 (26)
Westmoreland	4.6 (7)	3.5 (22)	3.7 (29)
St. Elizabeth	6.0 (9)	15.5 (97)	13.6 (106)
Manchester	15.2 (23)	20.3 (127)	19.3 (150)
Clarendon	10.6 (16)	10.0 (63)	10.2 (79)
St. Catherine	7.3 (11)	9.3 (58)	8.9 (69)
Not Applicable (i.e., outside of Jamaica)	12.6 (18)	4.9 (31)	6.4 (50)



Table 5 presents cross-tabulation between those who have had run-ins (being accused, detained, or arrested) with the JDF and Area of Residence in Jamaica. The findings revealed a significant statistical relationship between the two aforementioned variables ( $\chi^2 (14) = 48.0425, P < 0.001$ ).

**Table 5**  
**A cross-tabulation between Those Who Have Had Run-Ins (being accused, detained, or arrested) with the JDF and Area of Residence in Jamaica**

Details	Run-ins		Total, %
	Yes % (n)	No % (n)	(n) % (n)
<b>Parish of residence</b>			
Kingston	8.3 (8)	6.6 (45)	6.8 (53)
St. Andrew	7.3 (7)	5.9 (40)	6.0 (47)
St. Thomas	6.3 (6)	1.8 (12)	2.3 (18)
Portland	13.5 (13)	4.2 (29)	5.4 (42)
St. Mary	2.1 (2)	1.9 (13)	1.9 (15)
St. Ann	6.3 (6)	4.8 (33)	5.0 (39)
Trelawny	0.0 (0)	2.3 (16)	2.1 (16)
St. James	3.1 (3)	5.3 (36)	5.0 (39)
Hanover	4.2 (4)	3.2 (22)	3.3 (26)
Westmoreland	4.2 (4)	3.8 (26)	3.9 (30)
St. Elizabeth	5.2 (5)	14.9 (102)	13.7 (107)
Manchester	7.3 (7)	20.9 (143)	19.3 (150)
Clarendon	7.3 (7)	10.5 (72)	10.1 (79)
St. Catherine	12.5 (12)	8.2 (56)	8.7 (68)
Not Applicable (i.e., outside of Jamaica)	12.5 (12)	5.6 (38)	6.4 (50)
<b>Total</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>779</b>

Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for people's perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) for the last 6 months. The seven-item scale is relatively good to assess a single variable referred to as the operating standard of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF,  $\alpha = 0.667$ ). Generally, the sampled respondents disagreed that the operating standards of the JDF are high for the last 6 months. Furthermore, the sampled respondents agreed that the operating standards of the JDF have fallen in the last 6 months; but that people are still afraid of soldiers. The findings indicate that people have lost respect for the JDF in the last 6 months. In addition, people disagreed that the JDF is still relevant in today's society.

**Table 6**  
**Descriptive Statistics for People's Perception of The Operating Standards of the JDF (1/2 year)**

Details	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The JDF operates at a high standard	1.9276	0.42271	773
The operating standards of the JDF have fallen	3.8900	0.43137	773
Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner	1.9405	0.39958	773
Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers	3.8680	0.42362	773
The JDF is still relevant in today's society	2.3415	0.55970	773
I am afraid of soldiers	4.1578	0.54434	773

I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public	3.9547	0.51583	773
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Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for people's perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) over the last 12 months. The seven-item scale is relatively good to assess a single variable referred to as the operating standard of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF,  $\alpha = 0.751$ ). Generally, the sampled respondents are neutral on the matter that the operating standards of the JDF were high during the last 12 months. Furthermore, people agreed that the JDF was relevant one year ago, and they are neutral on whether the JDF is too frequently used by governments.

**Table 7**  
**Descriptive Statistics for People's Perception of the JDF (1 year)**

<b>Details</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>N</b>
The JDF operates at a high standard	3.0616	1.10031	747
The operating standards of the JDF have fallen	2.7724	1.04671	747
Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner	3.0335	1.08250	747
Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers	2.4699	1.00139	747
The JDF is still relevant in today's society	4.0147	.95953	747
I am afraid of soldiers	3.5609	1.12489	747
I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public	2.9933	1.18467	747

Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for people's perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) 2 years ago. The seven-item scale is relatively good to assess a single variable referred to as the operating standard of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF,  $\alpha = 0.744$ ). Generally, the sampled respondents are neutral on the matter that the operating standards of the JDF were high during the last 24 months. The sampled respondents agreed that the JDF was relevant 2 years ago and they are neutral of the professional behaviour of operating JDF members on the streets.

**Table 8**  
**Descriptive Statistics for People's Perception of the JDF (2 years)**

<b>Details</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>N</b>
The JDF operates at a high standard	3.1116	1.09919	726
The operating standards of the JDF have fallen	2.8664	1.06482	726
Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner	3.1364	1.09261	726
Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers	2.5124	1.03283	726
The JDF is still relevant in today's society	3.9945	.96845	726
I am afraid of soldiers	3.5234	1.15017	726
I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public	2.9821	1.19468	726

Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for people's perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) 5 years ago. The seven-item scale is relatively good to assess a single variable referred to as the operating standard of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF,  $\alpha = 0.744$ ). Generally, the sampled respondents are neutral on the matter that the operating standards of the JDF were high about 5 years ago. The sampled respondents have a neutral perspective on 1. The operating standards of the JDF are high, 2. The operating standards of the JDF have fallen 3. The members of the JDF are too

frequently used as police officers, and 4. They have lost respect for the JDF. However, on average, they agreed that the JDF is relevant in today’s society.

**Table 9**  
**Descriptive Statistics for People’s Perception of the JDF (5 years)**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The JDF operates at a high standard	3.3121	1.09086	721
The operating standards of the JDF have fallen	2.9307	1.04518	721
Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner	3.2691	1.06706	721
Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers	2.6519	1.05647	721
The JDF is still relevant in today’s society	4.0444	.92390	721
I am afraid of soldiers	3.5201	1.14985	721
I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public	3.0458	1.16278	721

Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for people's perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) 10 years ago. The seven-item scale is relatively good to assess a single variable referred to as the operating standard of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF,  $\alpha = 0.744$ ). Generally, the sampled respondents agreed on the matter that the operating standards of the JDF were high about 10 years ago. Ten years ago, people believe that the JDF operated at a high standard, relevant to the society, members operated at a high professional standard, and they were afraid of soldiers.

**Table 10**  
**Descriptive Statistics for People’s Perception of the JDF (10 years)**

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
The JDF operates at a high standard	3.5381	1.05093	721
The operating standards of the JDF have fallen	3.2011	1.07098	721
Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner	3.4632	1.01740	721
Members of the JDF are too frequently used as police officers	3.1429	1.10321	721
The JDF is still relevant in today’s society	4.1248	.90275	721
I am afraid of soldiers	3.4854	1.20191	721
I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public	3.1331	1.20831	721

Table 11 presents the overall summative descriptive statistics on people’s perception of the operating standards of the JDF over 5 specific periods. The findings revealed that generally, people are neutral on the overall operating standards of the JDF.

**Table 11**  
**Summative Descriptive Statistics on People’s Perception of Overall Operating Standards of the JDF**

Details	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
6 months ago	3.15	0.26	2.14	4.00	791
1 year ago	3.33	0.36	1.50	4.43	787
2 years ago	3.36	0.41	1.83	5.00	787



5 years ago	3.39	0.41	1.71	5.00	788
10 years ago	3.36	0.41	2.00	5.00	786

The public’s perception of the overall operating standards of the JDF by the resident status of sample respondents is presented in Table 12. Using an independent sample t-test, the findings revealed that irrespective of the public being residents of Jamaica or outside resident-Jamaican, there was no significant statistical difference in their perception of the overall operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF). Jamaicans have a neutral perception of the overall operating standards of the JDF. This denotes that Jamaicans are indecisive about the standards of the members of the JDF who operate on the streets.

**Table 12**  
**Summative Descriptive Statistics on People’s Perception of the Operating Standards of the JDF by Resident Status**

	<b>Resident status</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>Std. Error Mean</b>
6 months ago	Jamaica	699	3.1612	.25819	.00977
	Outside of Jamaica	87	3.1054	.29513	.03164
1 year ago	Jamaica	695	3.3327	.35784	.01357
	Outside of Jamaica	87	3.3205	.39681	.04254
2 years ago	Jamaica	696	3.3629	.39711	.01505
	Outside of Jamaica	87	3.3433	.47439	.05086
5 years ago	Jamaica	696	3.3958	.40396	.01531
	Outside of Jamaica	87	3.3859	.49053	.05259
10 years ago	Jamaica	695	3.3615	.40256	.01527
	Outside of Jamaica	87	3.3415	.43483	.04662

The P-value for each of the descriptive statistics by period is greater than 0.05

Using an Independent sample t-test, a significant statistical difference emerged between those who had a run-in with the JDF and those who did not on the overall public’s perception of the operating standards of the JDF ( $P < 0.05$ ). Those who had a run-in with the JDF indicated a low level of neutrality on the overall operating standards of the JDF (Table 13).

**Table 13**  
**Summative Descriptive Statistics on People’s Perception of the Operating Standards of the JDF by Resident Status**

	<b>Run-in with JDF</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Deviation</b>	<b>Std. Error Mean</b>	<b>t value, P value</b>
6 months ago	Yes	96	3.0372	.30901	.03154	-4.718, <0.001
	No	693	3.1703	.25140	.00955	
1 year ago	Yes	95	3.2404	.41286	.04236	-2.301, =0.012
	No	690	3.3426	.35250	.01342	
2 years ago	Yes	95	3.2326	.42445	.04355	-3.147, 0.001
	No	690	3.3778	.40026	.01524	
5 years ago	Yes	95	3.2539	.40029	.04107	-3.613, < 0.001
	No	691	3.4127	.41239	.01569	
10 years ago	Yes	95	3.2752	.35008	.03592	-2.419, 0.008
	No	689	3.3700	.41179	.01569	

Descriptive statistics on the public's perception of selected operating standards of the JDF (i.e., high operating standards, operating standards of the JDF have fallen, and members of the JDF operate professionally) are presented in Table 14. The public believes that the operating standards of the JDF have fallen over time as well as the professionalism of members who operate on the streets of Jamaica. In addition, on average, the public agreed that the operating standards of the JDF have fallen. Furthermore, the public indicated that they have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public in the last 6 months, and outside of this time, they were indecisive on the matter.

**Table 14**  
**Descriptive Statistics on Selected Overall Issues on the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)**

	<b>The JDF operates at a high standard</b>	<b>The operating standards of the JDF have fallen</b>	<b>Generally, the members of the JDF operate in a professional manner</b>	<b>I have lost respect for the JDF because of how it operates with the public</b>
1/2 year	1.9 ±0.4	3.9±0.4	1.9±0.4	2.0±0.5
1 year	3.1±1.1	2.8±1.0	3.0±1.1	3.0±1.2
2 years	3.1±1.1	2.9±1.1	3.1±1.1	3.0±1.2
5 years	3.3±1.1	2.9±1.1	3.3±1.1	3.0±1.2
10 years	3.5±1.1	3.2±1.1	3.5±1.0	3.1±1.2

Figure 1 depicts the sampled respondents' views on whether the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is accountable to the people of Jamaica. Of the sampled respondents (n=791), the response rate to the aforementioned issue is 94.56 % (n=748). Of those who responded to the question (i.e., Do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?), 72 in every 100 of them said yes.




Figure 1. The Jamaica Defence Force is accountable to the people of Jamaica

Table 15 presents a cross-tabulation of 'do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?' and the gender of the sampled respondents. The chi-square revealed that there is no significant statistical association between the two aforementioned variables ( $\chi^2 (2) = 0.129, P = 0.937$ ).

This means that the public's gender does not change its perspective on whether the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is accountable to the people of Jamaica.

**Table 15**  
**A cross-YTabulation of ‘do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?’ and the gender of the sampled respondents**

Do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?	Gender			Total
	Male	Female	Non-biny	
	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	
Yes	72.5 (216)	71.8 (318)	66.7 (4)	72.0 (538)
No	27.5 (82)	28.2 (125)	33.3 (2)	28.0 (209)
<b>Total</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>747</b>

Table 16 presents a cross-tabulation of ‘do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?’ and the nationality of the sampled respondents. The chi-square revealed that there is no significant statistical association between the two aforementioned variables ( $\chi^2 (2) = 0.811, P = 0.368$ ). This denotes that the public's nationality does not change its perspective on whether the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is accountable to the people of Jamaica.

**Table 16**  
**A cross-tabulation of ‘do You Believe that the JDF is Accountable to the People of Jamaica?’ and the Nationality of the Sampled Respondents**

Do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?	Jamaica			Total
	Jamaican	Otherwise		
	% (n)	% (n)	% (n)	
Yes	72.4 (524)	63.6 (14)	72.1 (538)	
No	27.5 (82)	36.4 (8)	7.9 (208)	
<b>Total</b>	<b>724</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>746</b>	

Table 17 presents a cross-tabulation of ‘do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?’ the residential status (i.e., in Jamaica, Outside of Jamaica). The chi-square revealed that there is no significant statistical association between the two aforementioned variables ( $\chi^2 (2) = 0.067, P = 0.795$ ). This denotes that the public's residential status does not change its perspective on whether the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is accountable to the people of Jamaica.

**Table 17**  
**A cross-tabulation of ‘do You Believe that the JDF is Accountable to the People of Jamaica?’ and the Residential status of the Sampled Respondents**

Do you believe that the JDF is accountable to the people of Jamaica?	Jamaica		Total
	In Jamaica	Outside of Jamaica	
	% (n)	% (n)	
Yes	72.1 (478)	70.7 (58)	71.9 (536)
No	27.9 (185)	29.3 (24)	28.1 (209)

<b>Total</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>745</b>
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Figure 2 denotes a bar graph for the Public’s Perception of how the ‘The Jamaica Defence Force can bolster respect among the Public’. The findings revealed that the majority of the public believes that the Jamaica Defence Force can bolster respect among the residents of Jamaica by ‘having an independent entity investigate incidents relating to its members (64.3%, n= 509)’, ‘responding quicker to issues following incidents involving members of the JDF (64.0%, n=507)’, ‘engaging in community activities such as building schools, roads, indigent houses etc. (61.4%, n=486) and so forth.




Figure 2: The Public’s Perception of how the ‘The JDF can bolster respect among the Public’

**DISCUSSION**

The current study employed a national cross-sectional web-based descriptive research design to explore the public’s perception of the operating standards of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF). The responsibility for Jamaica’s national security and sovereignty is an important task that requires serious commitment from the JDF and other stakeholders (Government of Jamaica, and; Ministry of National Security, nd). The Jamaican government’s responsibility for national security accounts for the deployment of the Jamaica Defense Force in joint military operations with the Jamaica Constabulary Force because of the violent crime situation in the nation (Britannica, nd), and as such interacting with the public sometimes regularly. However, with that commitment comes an ongoing requirement of sustainable trust predicated on consistent operations and management during the performance of duties. Jamaicans’ trust in the JDF can be a strategic asset that could provide a competitive advantage through operation effectiveness, inter-collaboration with other public service organizations, public loyalty, dedication, cooperation, and healthy exchange relationships.

According to Britannica (nd), “The Jamaican police have been criticized for a high rate of extrajudicial killings” and so Jamaicans had a lower degree of trust for the police compared to the army (Powell, Bourne, and Waller, 2007). Hence, the security of a nation is also based on the public’s trust in the entities that are responsible for the security and protection of the populace (Fontaine, et al., 2017). It is difficult, therefore, for many crimes to be solved because of the gulf between the citizenry and the security forces (Horn, 2021; Fontaine, et al., 2017; Girardi, 2021) as would the case when the army becomes a part of the crime-fighting solution in society. Previous research shows that the success of organizations is connected to a strong level of customer trust (Fukuyama, 1995). Fukuyama (1995) noted that trust is critical in human relations and that without it; there will be no social solidarity. Therefore, the idea of distrust/trust in the service industry is complex and fragile; but explains the difficulty to address crime in societies (Goldsmith, 2005; Ohana, 2010; The Guardian, 2019; Pérez-Vincent, S. & Scartascini, 2021).

The Service industry researchers contend that effective theoretical frameworks that aid in further clarity are vital to better understanding this involved phenomenon (Flores-Macías & Zarkin, 2022; Hasbrouck, 2019; Hines et al., 2015). For this study, the OMT served as the theoretical framework for understanding the JDF's strategies for operational and production interventions as perceived by the Jamaican public. Any service-oriented organization must focus on dual trust. Dual trust pertains to internal trust, which exists among employees and employers, while external trust exists among the organization and the public. Trust for the military profession is a critical component of its existence, not just among military personnel but also among the masses. A deduction that can be made from the current study is that different publics are losing their trust in the Jamaica Defense Force.

Establishing trust among the public requires continued engagement and demonstrations of behaviors that uphold the stated mission and values of the organization. Qualities such as discipline, military expertise and stewardship are embedded into the military's daily operations and modelled starting with the organization's leadership. Although research shows continued support for the military in many countries and their standard operating procedures in many countries, other countries are less trusting. The history of relationships among employees and customers, organization milieu and operations influence the public's perception of organizations in the service industry. Studies show that not only is it essential to establish trust, but more importantly, is the sustainability of that trust over time. This study sought to ascertain the public's perception of the JDF over a decade.

The perception of the Jamaican public toward the JDF's operational effectiveness, including its "policing" activities and interactions with the general public, has declined. This decline occurred over the past decade, especially within the past six months. A more precise understanding of the JDF's operations and effectiveness is critical to address among the Jamaican public. Combined with effective management and implementation of strategies to meet the intended mission and vision, the JDF should consider image rebranding to address the decline in public perception and trust. This research also highlights that the Jamaican public deems the JDF relevant and essential to the nation's security operations. However, JDF leadership should revisit the involvement with local policing duties, as it may be an ineffective use of the JDF's time beyond emergencies. The following conclusion and recommendations hint at the possible direction for future rebranding, public relations and operational enhancements for the JDF leadership and its general stakeholders, which includes the Jamaican public.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is a combined military of Jamaica (i.e., infantry Regiment and Reserve Corps, Air Wing, Coast Guard, and Engineering Unit) designed based on the British military model. The JDF was not designed as a paramilitary organization and so would support the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in its policing operations. Despite the traditional military structure of the Jamaica Defence Force, the organization has been deployed on the streets of Jamaica by political administrations to curb and remedy the difficulty of policing society (Jamaica Defence Force, 2021b), and this explains a justification for a public assessment of this organization.

The public is indecisive on whether the Jamaica Defence Force is too frequently used jointly with the Police Constabulary Force to police the streets of Jamaica as well as neutral on the overall operating standards of the organization. The various public indicated that members of the Jamaica Defence Force, who operate on the streets, have lowered their professionalism and high standards in the last 6 months. As such, they believe that this can be bolstered by 1) 'having an independent entity investigate incidents relating to its members (64.3%, n= 509)', 'responding quicker to issues following incidents involving members of the JDF (64.0%, n=507)', and 'engaging in community activities such as building schools, roads, indigent houses etc. (61.4%, n=486).

## **RECOMMENDATION**

Relationships among the military, leaders and citizens is an organic and dynamic phenomenon that evolves. These relationships may change in stability based on the current state of society. Understanding the operational purpose of the military and its support for government and civilians is an essential step in military function and important long term. Therefore, further studies are warranted to understand the operations of the JDF and whether those operations change over time. Further exploration as to why the public's perception further declined over the last six months is warranted.

Jamaican leadership should evaluate the current extension of military personnel to duties that overlap with the police and indicate whether this is the most efficient use of military involvement long term. While occasional inter-security collaboration is essential in emergencies, every day the use of military personnel to supplement the police force should not become the norm.

This part consists of two (2) sub-parts: the article's conclusion and suggestions or recommendations from the research. Conclude the article critically and logically based on the research findings. Please be careful in generalizing the results. The authors should also state the research limitation in these parts. Generally, the conclusion should explain how the research has moved the body of scientific knowledge forward. In suggestion, please describe the author's recommendations for further studies regarding the author's research implication.

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