

Intelligence Strategy on Deradicalization Program to Prevent Acts of Terrorism by Ex-Napiter Network of JAD Group

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ABSTRACT

The deradicalization programs conducted by BNPT and other stakeholders have been running since the enactment of Law Number 5 of 2018, marking the starting point for changing the paradigm of handling terrorism in Indonesia. Terrorism convicts are then assessed, rehabilitated, re-educated, and reintegrated into society as part of the program. The program also runs outside the prison for ex-terrorism convicts offering support to ex-terrorism convicts as they reintegrate to the community. However, despite these efforts, some ex-convicts return to commit terrorist crimes. Thus, preventive measures are needed, especially in term of strategic intelligence measures to prevent this risk. This paper uses a qualitative approach with case study research. Data collected through interviews as primary data and supported by secondary data derived from official government documents and other journal articles. The case study on the application of the intelligence strategy is explained in the handling of ex-convict P in Solo Raya, in which the intelligence strategy implemented successfully monitor the movement of ex-convicts, facilitates their reintegration into society and be able to help officers communicate with ex-convicts who are still incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is an extraordinary crime that threatens the safety and life of society. It is defined as acts of violence targeting non-combatants or property, to obtain political, ideological, or religious goals through fear and intimidation. Brian M. Jenkins defines terrorism as acts involving violence or threats of violence to civil society that are publicized to spread fear and followed by specific political demands made by individuals or groups. Terrorism arises as a reaction to something that happens in society as described by as a social formation. (Mayer, 2016) (Coman Et Al., 2021) (O'brien, 2008)

Indonesia has experienced terrorism incidents as explained by the series even since 1962 with the Cikini bomb incident, the hijacking of Garuda DC-9 Woyla aircraft in 1981, the Kosekta 8606 Cicendo Komtabes 86 Bandung bombing in 1982, the BCA Pacenongan Jakarta bombing and the Pemudi Ekspres Night Bus in 1985. The series of bombings continued with the Ramayana bombing on Jl. Sabang in 1999 and the Philippine embassy bombing, and Malaysia and church bombing in 2000. The bombings persisted until the devastating Bali Bombing 1 occurred on October 12, 2002, at Paddy's Club and Sari Club in Legian Kuta, Bali, as well as the United States Consulate in Renon, Denpasar. These attacks resulted in the loss of more than 200 people and injured hundreds more. The incident was a turning

point in the eradication and countering of terror in Indonesia despite the arrest, trial and conviction of Imam Samudra, Idris, Dulmatin, Umar Patek, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Ali Fauzi, Qomarudin, M. Gufron and Mubarak. (Mobley, 2008) (Mobley, 2008) The approach to combating terror in Indonesia began to change along with amendments to the law on combating and countering terrorism through the emergence of Law Number 5 of 2018. This law amended Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Acts into Law. One of the changes in approach is the implementation of a deradicalization program. This program was delivered by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) aimed at reducing and eliminating one's radical ideas. The deradicalization stage carried out by BNPT is divided into two programs inside prisons and outside prisons. The stages inside the prison include identification, rehabilitation, re-education, and reintegration, while the program outside the prison focuses identification, religious formation, national insight, and entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, deradicalization is described as an attempt to get extremists to abandon extremist perspectives, decide that violence is unacceptable and carry out social change through habituation to follow norms, rationalization to avoid aligning preferences with forced behavior, and internal dialogue that can sensitize extremists. (Riedel, 2011)

Based on BNPT data (2022), the number of terrorism convicts (prisoners) in Indonesia is 1,290 prisoners. Of this number, there are 8% who refuse to participate in the deradicalization program, leaving only around 120 people are willing to join the deradicalization program from the government. Meanwhile, in deradicalization activities conducted outside of prison, BNPT (2023) recorded that from 1,192 ex-prisoners carried out deradicalization programs, 116 of them returned to become terrorism recidivists. The return of ex-prisoners to terror perpetrators can be seen from several incidents that occurred. The incident at the Astana Anyar Bandung Police Station, reported by Liputan 6 (2022), carried out by Agus Sujanto, also known as Agus Muslim bin Wahid, who is an ex-prisoner and is related to the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) group. In the Sarinah bombing incident, two of the five perpetrators mentioned by Kompas (2016) were recidivists, namely Afif, also known as Sunakim, a recidivist of the Bank CIMB Niaga Medan robbery, whose funds were later known to be used by terror groups. Another recidivist, Muhammad Ali, was also related to the case and related to military training in the Jalin Jantho Mountains, Aceh Besar. In the case of military training in Mount Jalin Jantho Aceh Besar. Tempo (2010) recorded the involvement of Kamaludin who had been sentenced to six years in prison after previously arrested in the same case and imprisoned for three years.

Several studies have been conducted to evaluate deradicalization programs conducted by the Government of Indonesia. A review of the implementation of the deradicalization program has revealed their failure, dating back to the government's initial efforts since 2008. The failure is attributed to the lack of comprehensiveness and sustainability. According to Subagyo (2021), the deradicalization program primarily involves government actors, in this case BNPT, academics, and civil society. However, it notably lacks participation from the involvement of the media sector, which serves to spread positive narratives related to former terrorists to the public and also the lack participation of business groups that play a role in accommodating and providing jobs for ex-prisoners. In addition, research conducted by Islam (2019) on deradicalization programs in Indonesia underscores their limited success, primarily due to the absence of adequate financial mechanisms and commitments from relevant officials. In Islamic research (2019), the deradicalization approach in Indonesia tends to refer more to the release of terrorists in successful acts of violence in the short term, resulting in temporary solutions. Measurement of the effectiveness of the deradicalization program have also revealed internal obstacles such as budget problems, limited prison facilities, and low public acceptance of ex-prisoners. (Subagyo, 2021; Senses & Aji, 2019)

Terrorists who have participated in deradicalization programs are very vulnerable to being re-radicalization and recruitment, underscoring the need for a long-term strategy of cooperation and engagement. (Spaaij, 2011) this paper discusses the deradicalization program for ex-prisoners with the initials P, who were formerly incarcerated due to their connections with Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD). P was sentenced 5 years and 6 months prison term for his involvement in arms smuggling. Upon release, P received assistance from BNPT, with periodic monitoring was carried out by stakeholders and approaches were made by both mass organizations and the community. The deradicalization program

for P needs to be explored to find out the extent of the program carried out and assess the impacts, whether it achieved its intended goal of deradicalization or had unintended consequences.

This paper also focuses on the significance of interagency collaboration, including the involvement of intelligence agencies, in terms of deradicalization is a form of counterterrorism efforts. The counterterrorism strategy requires intelligence engagement on counter-espionage to identify external threats, gather information from infiltrated agents, apply intelligence tactics and ensure rapid response from law enforcement agencies. The participation of intelligence agencies in deradicalization programs is also an implementation of their intelligence function, providing strategic warnings to policy makers to then collaborate through government policy measures. Both long-term and short-term strategies for the involvement of intelligence in counterterrorism efforts need to be examined as considerations to improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism and deradicalization programs, especially to ex-prisoners outside prison (Phythian, 2013; Jensen, 2016).

METHODS

Research in this study uses qualitative research methodology, which described by as research that examines meaning and interpretation from the perspective of participants. In qualitative research, researchers are expected to immerse themselves in the experiences had by the research subject, becoming involved in the context and situation that occurs. The type of research used is a case study, which is research that aims to find a case picture and then analyze a social symptom, the depth of a case, and a picture of the social environment. The data in this paper were obtained from interviews with officers involved in the deradicalization program of ex-prisoner P in Solo as primary data, as well as publications of scientific institutions and journals as secondary data (Ahmadi & Rose, 2014; Ahmadi & Rose, 2014).


Basic Intelligence Functions

In carrying out its function as a policy advisory tool and supporting deradicalization programs, intelligence agency carries out its basic functions, namely investigation, security, and data gathering as mentioned by Saronto (2018). The investigation was mentioned by Hatmodjo (2003) as an effort to collect information that meets the elements of what, who, where, when, why, and how or 5W1H (What, Who, Where, When, Why and How). In carrying out this function, several instruments can be used as mentioned by Saronto (2018), such as open investigations in the form of interviews and interrogations, as well as closed investigations including observation, tracking, wiretapping and intrusion. The sources of intelligence information in the investigation are very diverse. Phythian (2013) explained the source of information derived from agents called human intelligence (HUMINT), the source of signal tapping is called signal intelligence (SIGINT), quantitative and qualitative data categorized as measurement intelligence (MASINT), the source of secretly collected photos known as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and intelligence obtained from open sources or open-source intelligence (OSINT). In the security function, Saronto (2018) explained that security is a step to prevent interference with operations, communication and information materials carried out by opposing parties. Meanwhile, Saronto (2018) describes the function of influence as an intelligence effort in changing the emotions, attitudes, behaviors, opinions and motivations (ESTOM) of the target through persuasive and coercive operations.

Intelligence Spinning Wheel

In carrying out these three functions, intelligence agency applies an intelligence cycle or commonly referred to as the intelligence rotation wheel (RPI). RPI is described as an intelligence flow that starts from operating orders, progresses to information collection, involves filtering information to then be used in the analysis process into intelligence and then concludes with dissemination to users in policy making. This cycle has a reverse arrow direction scheme which means if the information provided is not enough, then the process can return to the previous process. (Phythian, 2013)

Intelligence Spinning Wheel



RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Government Deradicalization Program

The deradicalization program in Indonesia is administered by BNPT, especially Deputy I for Prevention, Protection and Deradicalization which implements several stages in its implementation. Deradicalization by BNPT is explained to begin with the identification process using the Radicalism and Terrorism Measurement Tool (ACCURATE) to measure the ESTOM (Emotions, Attitudes, Behaviors, Opinions, and Motivations) of terrorists both inside and outside the prison using interview and observation techniques. Based on the identification results, BNPT divides prisoners into five categories mentioned divided into red, pink, orange, yellow and green categories, with red indicating high risk and green representing the lowest risk. The next program is rehabilitation, Adikara, Zuhdi, & Purwanto (2021) said that at this stage there is an independence development program to prepare prisoners for the economic independence upon their release. Personality development according to Adikara, Zuhdi, & Purwanto (2021) is carried out by BNPT in collaboration with religious experts, psychologists and ex-prisoners who have undergone deradicalization. The last stage is social reintegration. Adikara, Zuhdi, & Purwanto (2021) explained that this stage is a significant stage in the deradicalization process because it determines how the community accepts prisoners. Following up on the social reintegration program, BNPT (2023) collaborates with local governments, Perhutani, business actors, SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and other Ministries/Institutions (K/L) in empowering and assisting prisoners participating in the deradicalization program. Meanwhile, the deradicalization program outside prison is explained as a program for prisoners and their vulnerable families by providing economic independence programs, assisting in the process of reintegration and resocialization with the community, and taking preventive steps so that ex-prisoners do not return to commit acts of terrorism. (Adikara Et Al., 2021)(Arham & Runturambi, 2020)(Fitriana Et Al., 2017).

Terrorism by Ex-Napiter

Until 2022, BNPT has recorded that the number of prisoners involved in terrorism-related activities was around 1,290 prisoners. The number of prisoners who are unwilling to participate in the deradicalization program is 120 people or about 85 to 10% of the total number of prisoner's population. Meanwhile, the number of ex-prisoners who have completed their sentences and been released was 1,036 people, with 116 of them becoming recidivists. One of the perpetrators of terror attacks who is an ex-prisoner is Agus Sujanto aka Abu Muslim, the suicide bomber at the Astana Anyar Bandung Police Station who had been released in 2021. Previously, Agus Sujanto was a member of JAD and had served

a four-year sentence for being involved in planning terror acts in 2017 while incarcerated on Nusa Kambangan prison. (James et Al., 2021)

Terror attacks carried out by ex-prisoners also occurred in the Sarinah Thamrin Bomb. Kompas (2021) noted that the terror plan was prepared by Aman Abdurrahman aka Oman Rahman, who had been imprisoned for his involvement in military training cases in Aceh Besar, and Iwan Darmawan Muntho alias Rois, an Australian Embassy in Nusa Kambangan Kembang Kuning Prison. The plan was conveyed to the leader of JAD Ambon/Head of Laskar Ashkary Saiful Munthohir alias Abu Gar when visiting Aman Abdurrahman. Upon his return from Nusa Kambangan, Saiful contacted Muhammad Ali alias Rizal alias Abu Isa, a former convict of the Bank CIMB Niaga Medan robbery case, where the funds were used for acts of terrorism. Other Sarinah bombers include Afif alias Sunakim recidivist of the CIMB Niaga Medan Bank robbery, as well as Ahmad Muhazin and Dian Juni Kurniadi.

The bomber at Surabaya Police Station, Tri Murtiono, reported by Tempo (2018), had visited prisoners in Tulungagung Prison on behalf of Ridwan Sungkar. Meanwhile, suicide bomber Budi Satrio visited a prisoner named Dedi Rrfrizal. Additionally, Antaraneews (2017) revealed that the pot bomb terror in Pandawa Park, Arjuna Village, Cicendo District, Bandung City, was carried out by Yayat Cahdiyati alias Dani alias Abu Salam, who had affiliations with JAD and had been sentenced a three years prison (2012-2015) for his involvement in terrorist training in Mount Jalin Jantho Aceh Besar. Recidivist involvement in terrorism cases also occurred in the Samarinda Ecumenical Church Bombing. CNN (2016) noted that the perpetrator named Juhana, alias Jo bin Muhammad Aceng Kurnia, was a recidivist of the 2011 book bomb and Puspiteng Serpong bomb case. The perpetrator was previously detained for 3 years and 6 months and was released after receiving remission in July 2014. The same thing mentioned by Ashar (2023) noted that from 2002-2020 there were 94 ex-prisoners or as many as 11.39% of ex-prisoners became involved in subsequent terrorism cases. The same thing happened to foreign terrorist fighters (FTF). Ashar (2023) noted that based on Supreme Court data, 15 out of 40 former returnees attempted to rejoin the conflict in Syria. Moreover, 12 people planned terror to 11 police stations in West Java and North Sumatra, attacks on polling stations (TPS) and Bawaslu Offices.

Ex Napiter P in Solo Raya

Former Napiter P, who lives in Solo Raya, is a former terrorism convict who is one of the many prisoners monitored by security forces. P was involved in arms smuggling from the Philippines and was linked to the Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD) group. P, according to the court's decision, was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years and 6 months. P was released on parole in 2015 and this parole period concluded in 2018. Currently, P has mingled with the community, actively participating in worship, without any specific restrictions for prayer locations and recitation. P gets some help to run some business. Currently, he no longer participates in JAD activities and focuses on working to support his family. P was even willing to facilitate communication with ex-prisoners who did not want to communicate with security forces.

Monitoring as an investigation function to ex-prisoners P

The deradicalization program run by the government is aimed at prisoners who voluntarily participate in the program. Meanwhile, the number of prisoners willing to join the program in 2022 only reached 8% of the total number of prisoners. This relatively low number shows that there are many ex-prisoners who have not received deradicalization programs spread throughout the region. Intelligence agency play a vital role in carrying out its investigative function by monitor ex-prisoners. It's essential to recognize that the deradicalization process is an ongoing and continuous process, which includes monitoring ex-prisoners who have the potential to return to the group and commit acts of terror again. (Hettiarachchi, 2018)

Monitoring ex-prisoners involves the collection of information related to their activities. The collected information is then processed into intelligence nationally, representing a defensive counterterrorism measure carried out by a state. National intelligence collection related to terrorism often relies on incomplete data, which can be complemented by sharing good intelligence, especially with other countries' intelligence, particularly in the context of addressing cross-border terrorism. Intelligence monitoring on ex-prisoners was carried out intensively by both from the Police, Babinsa, BNPT and BIN. While this monitoring carried out openly by security officials to gather information about the target, it also serve as an effort to convey a message to ex-prisoners that they are under surveillance

by law enforcement. The message was delivered to warn ex-prisoners not to return to their group and not to commit crimes as before. In addition, regular visits by BNPT are also an effort to monitor the progress of social reintegration of ex-prisoners in the community, providing assistance and support. During these visits, similar messages are conveyed, emphasizing the importance of not repeating the same crimes. Activities involving ex-prisoners are also actively participated by P, both in the form of silaturahmi, halal bil halal, and the Indonesian Anniversary Memorial Ceremony. This activity, which is a collaboration between BNPT and the Regional Government, will reduce the potential for P to rejoin his group. (Jensen, 2016)

Closed monitoring is carried out by BIN and BNPT intelligence units as a function of crosschecking information obtained from open collection. However, this begins with an effective exchange of information between stakeholders concerning ex-prisoners in order to provide a comprehensive picture. The source of intelligence information in monitoring ex-prisoners is carried out using nets / agents or falls into the category of using HUMINT. The collection of information through HUMINT explained by Hitz (2007) exceeds the ability to collect from other sources because information from other sources still requires human ability to speak it in the form of words. In conducting counterterrorism, emphasizing the need for diligence in observing terror networks, recruiting and entering networks into congregations and in-depth investigations in finding explosives. The use of HUMINT in accordance with counterterrorism operations falls into three categories, namely monitoring or observing the activities of individuals or organizations to collect information; tracking, which entails discreet and continuous surveillance of individual or organizational targets; and closed investigations are conducted by officers who infiltrate under the guise and build personal relationships with targeted individuals or organizations. Several agents were stationed near the target of ex-prisoner P, to find out daily activities and monitor movements covertly. (Cormac, 2013) (Nugrahani & Hum, 2014)

Information from HUMINT called Hitz (2007) is a puzzle that must be equipped with information from various sources, such as the results of communication interception (SIGNIT), internet surveillance or called by Omand (2021) digital surveillance, open sources (OSINT), and measurement data from related institutions (MASINT) to then form a comprehensive intelligence product. Wiretapping and digital surveillance are carried out if it is necessary to deepen the target that shows indications that lead to active terror networks to plan attacks. In terms of digital surveillance, Omand (2021) emphasizes the observance of procedures and ethics to respect citizens' privacy and prevent misuse. Eavesdropping is carried out to determine ex-prisoner communication on the device he has. In P, monitoring is still carried out especially after the person concerned changes the number because the number is blocked. When a new number is obtained, intelligence officers employ various methods to ensure continuous monitoring.

In monitoring ex-prisoner P, it is necessary to cooperate in terms of exchanging information to each stakeholder. In this case, intelligence information sharing and collaboration in intelligence operations are needed as a form of information dissemination in the application of intelligence rotation wheels. Dissemination of information followed by coordination and cooperation will increase the effectiveness of security operations and prevent terrorist attacks. Intelligence agency, according to Mobley (2008), needs to improve the ability periodically to deal with the development of counterintelligence capabilities of terrorist groups that are also growing, because these groups will evaluate and adapt when the system is disrupted both in the form of arrest and failure attacks.

Intelligence Security in the Handling of Ex-Napiter P

Security, according to Saronto (2018), is the obligation of every intelligence member both in securing state secrets, identity, physical assets, information materials, operations and organizations. To achieve security objectives, intelligence practitioners employ tradecraft—a set of tactics and techniques. The application of tradecraft carried out in the context of security, explained Saronto (2018), is carried out using a guise, namely a pretext made by people, institutions, or installations to hide secret activities and break the achievement of tasks that function for defensiveness, such as aiding in detection avoidance from adversaries, and providing access to targets and facilitating the implementation of operations. Security, as Saronto (2018), can also be done by applying counterintelligence in the form of detecting potential disturbances in operations and other clandestine activities, conducting

investigations when there are clues, penetrating opponents, and exploitation in the form of detention if the opposition endangers the operations carried out.

Security in handling ex-prisoner P, focused on the use of covers for agents stationed near P. The agent must have a cover name and cover story to be able to enter the circle P and establish closeness with P. The aim is that with this closeness, P will not hesitate to tell everything related to himself and his activities. With the construction of a good security system in the application of cover, communication security, and information materials, it is hoped that operations carried out to detect terrorist movements will be more optimal.

Security is also a form of counterintelligence anticipation against terrorist organizations. According to Riedel (2011), terrorist groups have intelligence collection capabilities and collaborate with like-minded groups to carry out global attacks. Terrorist group counterintelligence capabilities are also revealed by Mobley (2008) that, terrorist groups with rigid and hierarchical organizational structures have more reliable counterintelligence capabilities than terrorist groups that are decentralized with their network systems.

Raising Function to Ex-Napiter P

Rehabilitation for ex-prisoner P is one of the keys in the radicalization process, as Hettiarachchi (2018) states that after getting out of prison, prisoners become very vulnerable to return to their group and commit crimes again. Often, upon their release, ex-prisoners did not have enough provisions to support themselves and their families and to then return to society. This situation makes ex-prisoners susceptible to rejoining groups that offer financial assistance. Therefore, BNPT assesses individuals like P and offers several programs that can be a source of livelihood. P, who worked odd jobs, were given assistance in making a fishpond business. In the process of making fishponds, P also sells chips at a stall owned by other ex-prisoners fostered by BNPT. This collaboration will create a feeling of security for ex-prisoners, especially in terms of providing for themselves and their families. P also raises goats and sells herbs.

The lack of personal awareness to participate in programs and mentoring causes this ex-prisoner to experience difficulties in carrying out successful social reintegration. The problem of community acceptance is mentioned as causing the ineffectiveness of deradicalization programs. Research conducted by Rufaedah & Putra (2018) shows that the stigma pinned by the community is not only given to prisoners, but also to their families. The study shows that the wives of prisoners and ex-prisoners received harsh treatment and hurtful words from society that caused trauma and shame even to cases that occurred three to twelve years earlier. Stigma and rejection from the community to ex-prisoners who are vulnerable to re-radicalization contribute to causing ex-prisoners to return to their extremist groups and return to terror activities to commit terror attacks. (Islam, 2019) (Rufaedah & Son, 2018)

Intelligence needs to play a role in creating conditions so that people are willing to accept ex-prisoners to rejoin their groups through propaganda in conventional and online media. Reporting in the mass media is very influential on public acceptance, as the media is also used by terrorism to achieve their goals. Intelligence needs to invite both mainstream and digital media to jointly promote positive narratives related to deradicalization programs and acceptance of ex-prisoners in the midst of society. The dissemination of positive narratives is expected to change the ESTOM of the community and increase public acceptance which will affect the smooth social reintegration of ex-prisoners, fostering feelings of acceptance while minimizing the potential for ex-prisoners to return to terrorist groups and become perpetrators again. (Omand, 2021)

Raising for Former Napiter P through Community Leaders

In addition to raising awareness to support the success of the deradicalization program, especially in changing the ESTOM of the community to support the social reintegration of ex-prisoners, raising also needs to be carried out targeting community leaders and religious leaders. The awareness-raising was carried out with the aim of controlling ex-prisoners in the community. These community leaders and religious leaders' figures become agents who will invite the public to accept the existence of ex-prisoners. In addition, these figures are expected to be an extension of the eyes and ears of officers to monitor the development of ex-prisoners. By using community leaders and religious leaders, it is hoped that any signs of ex-prisoners rejoining extremist groups can be promptly identified, enabling the authorities to quickly follow up.

P, an ex-prisoner who has militant radical thoughts, experienced a turning point when he was imprisoned. It turned out that each prisoner also had different views and did not show things as he previously believed. This reluctance to return to his group must be captured by the community leaders in order to draw him into a moderate current in religion and society with the aim to facilitate P's smooth reintegration into society and prevent the repetition of past crimes. P received a gathering invitation from the Indonesian Mosque Council, which involved several other ex-prisoners. P is also active in coaching carried out by the administrators of Muhammadiyah, as one of the largest Islamic mass organizations that is expected to be able to bring an understanding of moderate Islam and rahmatan lil alamin.

In addition to mass organizations, raising for former P prisoners was also carried out through local neighborhood (RT) who invited him to be active in the community. The local neighborhood management is also one of the leading fortresses in monitoring the development of ex-prisoner P.

CONCLUSION

The deradicalization program for ex-inmate, known as Ex Napiter P, has been carried out well by all stakeholders by involving local governments, mass organizations, prominent figures and of course the community. P, who is able and well accepted when joining the community, shows a successful deradicalization program. P who wants to worship in any mosque, does not choose a place of study and even wants to collaborate to help communication with ex- prisoners who are still involved in showing the deradicalization program in a positive direction.

To ensure the sustainability of the deradicalization process, continuous open monitoring is essential. This includes sending a clear message that ex-prisoners are always monitored, observation is covered using covered agents, sustainable financial assistance, and increased community participation must continue to be carried out as part of a sustainable deradicalization process. This will break the chain of terrorism that continues to repeat itself because ex-prisoners are not optimally touched by intelligence strategies in deradicalization.

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