INTRODUCTION
Corruption
as part of the crime problem has become a commodity. Corruption becomes the
campaign theme during the campaign of political parties or the president and
vice president. However, without realizing it, corruption occurs because of the
election of leaders through high political costs, usually done by bribing the
voting public. Without realizing it, bribing the people by practicing money
politics during the election process led to the election of corrupt leaders (Pahlevi & Amrurobbi, 2020).
Money
politics is one practice that can create political corruption. As the mother of
corruption, money politics is Indonesia's main and most common problem (Aspinall, 2015). Money politics
becomes the main mouthpiece to create a leader who is pro to personal and group
interests. Money politics causes the political costs of a leader during the
election process to be expensive. Moreover, when a candidate is elected with a
bribery process, he or she will think about how the capital that has been
issued is returned and not think about the benefit (Pahlevi & Amrurobbi, 2020).
According
to Birch (2009), political
corruption in elections is usually carried out through the practice of money
politics. This will result in the "wrong" person winning. The
resulting government became less representative and accountable. The reason is
that the elected politicians will not prioritize the community's interests. In
addition, trust in them is low.
Moreover,
political corruption can also encourage corruption in other sectors. Selecting
a candidate to become a public official is important to consider jointly by the
voting community. Voters must understand that political corruption in money
politics will harm them. The relationship between leaders and their people is
only a clientelist relationship, not a good citizen (Pahlevi & Amrurobbi, 2020).
Pahlevi and Amrurobbi (2020)
argue that Money politics, or buying and selling votes, is buying people's
sovereignty. In addition, the people who received the money mortgaged their
sovereignty for a certain period. Moreover, if we pledge our sovereignty to the
authorities, we can no longer claim that sovereignty back. At least, it does
not have the right to demand authorities pay attention to our interests and
needs because we have received rewards for the legitimacy we have given to the
rulers. Consequently, we have no right to be irate if they (the rulers) corrupt
or abuse their position to enrich themselves or their group.
Post-Election
in the New Order Era, namely in the current Reformation Era, the General
Election is heavily spiced up by the phenomenon of money politics. Not
infrequently, the practice is carried out massively in society. Lately, it is
not just elections that are peppered with money politics. Simultaneous Regional
Head Elections and Village Head Elections also do not escape the pungent smell
of money politics. In short, money politics always appears at the forefront of
defeating the visions and missions or work programs of candidates and political
parties (Satria, 2019).
In
the opinion that when reviewing money politics in elections, it means that we
look at Election Law number 7 of 2017 in the realm of administrative law, but
some of its rules have criminal sanctions (Satria, 2019). Dogmatically,
such a model is often referred to as administrative penal law.
METHOD
Although the discourse of money politics has
long attracted the attention of researchers, empirical data on this topic are
still very limited both in quality and quantity, as has been done by (Aspinall, 2015; Hidayat, 2006). Even if there are
writings related to the practice of money politics, they are only based on
journalistic or anecdotal data or sourced from rumours and unproven claims (Corstange, 2012).
This research was conducted based on a
qualitative-descriptive approach. The problems that will be answered in this
manuscript are: How is the relationship
between the practice of money politics and electoral corruption rife at every
democratic party in Indonesia in the current reform era. Theoretically, the
basic purpose of writing this manuscript is to provide a complete description
and discourse on the concept of money politics as regulated in the General
Election Law number 7 of 2017, as well as with various kinds of literature,
especially its relation to political corruption.
RESULTS
AND DISCUSSION
1. Money Politics is like a Ghost.
Money politics is one of the serious problems
in every general election in Indonesia. Starting from the election of Village
Heads, Legislative Members, Regional Representatives Council (DPD), and Regional Heads to the
president, the practice of buying and selling influence the votes.
In three elections in the reform era, Indonesia
Corruption Watch noted an increase in money politics findings.
Table
1
Elections in the reform era
|
Election (Year)
|
Number
of Politics Money cases
|
Actors
|
|
1999
|
62
|
Political party administrators
of the Golongan Karya and PDI-P.
|
|
2004
|
113
|
Political party administrators, candidates
and success teams.
|
|
2009
|
150
|
Political party administrators, candidates
and success teams.
|
Source: ICW,2014
The
results of research and monitoring conducted by ICW in eight regions show that
most violations are related to money politics. The perpetrators are not only
candidates, success teams or parties with voters but also election organizers
such as the supervisory committee and the PPK (Irawan et al., 2014).
In addition, the mode of money politics in the
post-conflict local election has also undergone many 'improvements .'One of the
innovations made by the candidate/success team/party in money politics is
postpaid money politics. Giving money by the candidate/success team/party is
done after the voting is over. Voters just need to show a photo as proof that
they have chosen a certain candidate or political party.
Citing the opinion of Bumke (2010), there is no
standard definition of money politics. Money politics describes political
corruption, clientelism, and vote buying. Bumke (2010) generally categorizes money politics in three
dimensions: vote buying, vote
brokerage, and political corruption. Vote buying is the exchange of goods, services, or money for
votes in general elections. The person who represents a candidate/party to buy
votes is a vote broker. In
comparison, political corruption is any form of bribery to politicians to
obtain favorable policies or other benefits.
The same is confirmed by Aspinall (2014). According to him,
money politics is an Indonesian term related to voting buying and related phenomena. Just like Bumke (2010),
in addition to vote buying, vote
brokers or success teams are an important part of money politics. Choi (2004) states the
same thing. Money politics is a term used by many Indonesians.
Hodess (2004)
defines political corruption as the abuse of power by politicians (Political Leaders or Elected Officials)
for personal gain to increase power or wealth. In terms of time, political
corruption can occur before, during and after the perpetrator serves as a
public official. The phenomenon during the election process is called money politics. Money politics is an
attempt to bribe voters by giving money or services so voter preference can be
given to a bribe (Aspinall, 2015).
According to Hidayat (2006), money politics
starts from the candidate nomination process, during the campaign period, until
the 'H' day of the election, when votes are counted. There are two types of
money politics: directly giving money to voters. Second, indirectly by
providing various goods with high use and exchange value.
Although there is no clear definition related
to money politics, there are at least four important things that must be
considered related to money politics. First,
vote buying or buying votes. Second, vote for brokers or people/groups representing candidates to
distribute money/goods. Third,
money or goods are to be exchanged by vote. Fourth, voters and election organizers are the targets of money
politics (Irawan et al., 2014).
Like a ghost, political corruption in
elections is very difficult to prove that the elements are detrimental to state
finances unless law enforcers can think progressively with a progressive legal
framework. This should be done even though it rarely occurs in law enforcement
practices in Indonesia, especially in applying election law. The distinction
between election corruption as regulated "general" corruption and
political corruption in general elections requires a more in-depth study to
"capture" the element of state financial loss (Irawan et al., 2014).
2.
Money Political Crime =
Electoral Corruption
From some literature, money politics is often
referred to as electoral corruption. It is said that money politics is a
fraudulent act in the General Election, which is essentially the same as
corruption (Estlund, 2012). Thus, the terms money politics and electoral
corruption are essentially the same.
Regarding criminal acts in the Republic of
Indonesia, Law number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, 66 articles are
systematically regulated, namely in articles 488 to 554.
Based on Table 3, it can be seen that the
legislators intend to punish the perpetrators of criminal acts of money
politics more severely during quiet times than during voting or campaigns, with
a maximum penalty of punishment. Likewise, regarding the acceptable amount, it
is more when the money politics crime is carried out during a calm period than
during the campaign or at the time of voting.
According to Satria (2019), when viewed
epistemologically, RI Law 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections is in administrative
law. However, some of the rules have criminal sanctions. Legally dogmatic, such
a model is often referred to as administrative
penal law is all forms of regulation and product devices that are within
the scope or field of administration but have criminal sanctions. In such
conditions, criminal sanctions are usually made more maximal (Adji, 2014). The weight of criminal sanctions in the Law of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections is not under
the character of administrative, criminal law and modern criminal law doctrine.
This will impact the pattern of sanctions imposed by the Panel of Judges so
that it has the potential not to provide a deterrent effect for the
perpetrators. In the law enforcement process, in certain cases, the Election
Law is placed as a specialty (Lex
Specialist) of the Criminal Procedure Code as a general provision (Lex Generalis) (Adji, 2014).
In all regulations regarding general elections
in Indonesia, such as elections for members of the legislature, regional heads,
and presidents, none of them explicitly mention money politics. However, it is
called "influencing voters by distributing money or materials ."All
these regulations regulate the prohibition of buying and selling votes in
elections. Not only giving money/goods, candidates, campaign teams, and
organizers are also prohibited from making promises to influence voters (Irawan et al., 2014).
In the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 8 of
2013 regarding the general election of members of the People's Representative
Council, Regional Representative Council, and Regional People's Representative
Council, article 84 it is emphasized that during the quiet period, the
organizers, participants, and election campaign officers are prohibited from
promising or giving rewards to election campaigners. Voters do not exercise
their right to vote; Second, they exercise their right to vote by selecting
Election Contestants in a certain way so that their ballots are invalid;
electing certain Election Contesting Political Parties, and electing certain
candidates for DPD members.
Based on the RI Law No. 8/2013 mentioned
above, there are two sanctions for those proven to be involved in money
politics. First, the
cancellation of the names of candidates for members of The House of
Representatives (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), Provincial Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), and
Regency/Municipal DPRD from the final list of candidates; Second, the cancellation of the
determination of candidates for members of DPR, DPD, Provincial DPRD, and
Regency/Municipal DPRD as elected candidates.
Apart from the rules regarding the election of
members of the DPR, DPD, and DPR, the word money politics is not included in RI
Law Number 42 of 2008, which is the basis for the general election for
president and vice president. The scope of regulations relating to money
politics in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Law only applies to
the campaign and voting stages.
The relationship between money politics, which
in an anti-corruption perspective is often referred to as electoral corruption
and political corruption. This is very important because the two influence and
relate to each other. Because usually, electoral corruption is the forerunner
of political corruption. Meanwhile, the growth and development of political
corruption in a country strongly correlate with the ineffectiveness of social
control and law enforcement (Alkostar, 2008).
Dressler (2001)
separates political corruption from electoral corruption. Political corruption
is more inclined to abuse of power or position in government. Meanwhile,
electoral corruption can include buying votes with a certain amount of money in
elections, promising special positions, coercion, intimidation or other forms;
as explained by Dressler that political corruption concerns the illegal pursuit or misuse of public
office. Electoral corruption includes the purchase of votes with money,
promises of office or special favors, coercion, intimidation and other forms (Dressler, 2001).
It must be admitted that
purchasing votes with a certain amount of money in the General Election
requires a very high cost. In the context of elections in Indonesia, it becomes
high-cost alias and requires
large capital, which is mutatis mutandis when later elected, the first thing
that comes to the mind of the winner is how to return the capital that has been
used for the election contestation process. Moreover, it is at this point that
political corruption will occur by trading influence, abusing the positions
that have been obtained or buying and selling mode positions that often occur.
In short, political corruption is always intertwined with
electoral corruption, for example, fraud in campaigns or during voting (Larry, 2012).
Regarding electoral corruption, which ends in
political corruption, identifying the perpetrators is not too difficult. The
actors of electoral corruption are, first,
political parties. The second is the candidate or candidate pair. Third bureaucracy. Fourth, black people in business. Fifth, corrupt politicians. The result
between these actors will be very easy to realize the occurrence of electoral
corruption, which in the end is to form political corruption. Electoral
corruption will be even easier if a combination of abused power and black
business people. For this reason, a historian named Lord Acton emphasized that power tends to corrupt and absolute power to
corrupt absolutely. That every power tends to corrupt and absolute
power, the corruption must also be absolute (Satria, 2018).
The same thing was conveyed by Muhtadi (2013). Money politics operates in two domains, first at the elite level, such as
presidential candidates, members of the people's representative council,
regional people's representatives, governor candidates, regent candidates, and
mayoral candidates who come forward in the election process. Each candidate has
to dig deeper into his pocket, whether renting party boats, campaigns,
consultants, and even litigating to the Constitutional Court. Second, money politics at the mass
level is buying and selling votes to voters.
3. General Elections in Indonesia
A general election is a process of involving
citizens in the government process. Citizens are actively involved in
determining who has the right to control the government for a certain period.
This process presupposes the existence of sovereignty in the hands of the
people. Sovereign people have the right to determine who holds power and
regulates the lives of citizens. The sovereignty of the people is left partially
to the rulers. Because, in truth, the real sovereignty of the people remains in
the hands of the people. The ruler has the legitimacy to rule and exercise
power as long as it does not harm the interests of the people who surrender
part of their sovereignty. The transfer of some of the sovereignty through an
election procession (Pahlevi & Amrurobbi, 2020).
Pahlevi and Amrurobbi (2020)
The people who have given up part of their sovereignty
are still able and must control the day-to-day running of the government
outside the election procession. Sovereignty to oversee the running of this
government can be exercised directly or indirectly, such as through political
parties or civil society organizations. It becomes a crucial issue when handing
over part of the sovereignty to govern and run the government through a
transactional process called buying and selling votes, usually called money
politics.
Money Politics or buying and selling votes is
buying people's sovereignty. In addition, the people who received the money
mortgaged their sovereignty for a certain period. If we pledge our sovereignty
to the rulers, we cannot claim that sovereignty back. At least we have no right
to demand that the authorities pay attention to our interests and needs because
we have received a reward for the legitimacy we have given them (rulers).
Consequently, we have no right to be angry if
they (the rulers) corrupt or abuse their position to enrich themselves or their
group. Clientelism caused by money politics causes the relationship between the
people and power to become unbalanced becomes lame. It makes the people
powerless against the authorities. This imbalance will be maintained
continuously because it benefits the rulers and harms the people. Public
interest becomes irrelevant to discuss because clientelism makes power and
territory private.
Money politics is not new in elections in
Indonesia. In the first general election in 1955, money played an important
role in winning political parties (Bumke, 2010). The party pays
people who have influence, such as the sub-district head and foreman, to use
their influence to win the party. This is usually done at the end of the
campaign. The main source of party funds comes from political corruption. They
use ministerial positions to channel money into party coffers or use patronage
to gain influence or indirect funding. Sources of party funds can also come
from business. PNI has additional sources of income from Indonesian and Chinese
business groups, PKI from donations from Chinese business groups, and Masyumi
from land owners and batik entrepreneurs.
During the New Order era, there was a paradigm
shift. The phenomenon of money politics was rarely heard and recorded because
the general election was decorated with the use of power to win the government
party. All forces are united, concerned with winning the Golkar party. Thus,
the election is just a mere democratic ceremony. Elections were held, but
campaigning was severely restricted, many candidates were disqualified, and
various regulations were imposed disproportionately against the government's
political opponents (Ellis, 2016).
They were forced to place the cadres of the
Working Group and the military. The latter had important positions in the New
Order in important positions. Another way is to force influential figures to
join the Golkar party. State funds in the form of projects were used as
compensation for the supporters of the Working Group to win the election (Irawan et al., 2014).
Meanwhile, vote buying was widespread in the
reform era and took place systematically. In fact, without a vote-buying
strategy, a candidate or party cannot win the election process. There are
various forms of vote buying, ranging from t-shirts and cigarettes to
transportation fees. Meanwhile, in implementing elections in the reform era,
money politics was carried out in various more sophisticated ways. In addition,
the parties involved (vote brokers) are more numerous. The results of ICW's
monitoring in the elections for members of the DPR, DPD, and DPRD, the
president and vice president, and regional heads, show that money politics
cases continue to increase in quantity. (Irawan et al., 2014).
Muhtadi (2020)
stated that money politics has become a language that brings together
interactions between politicians and voters and has become the central point of
election campaigns in Indonesia, as the opinion of Schaffer (2007)
defines money politics only as a last resort in influencing the voter's
decision to cast his vote in the election, which is carried out a few days or
even hours before the vote, by giving cash, goods, or other material benefits
to voters.
Due to post-Soeharto electoral system reforms,
the open proportional system has contributed to the increasing incidence of
money politics in Indonesia. In an open proportional system, candidates must
compete against candidates from other parties for personal votes. In this
system, the candidate who gets the most votes is entitled to represent the
seats obtained by his party. As a result, they only need to win a handful of
votes to beat internal competitors. In a very tight internal competition system
like Indonesia, money politics can make the difference between winners and
losers (Muhtadi, 2020).
In the context of the open proportional system
implemented in Indonesia, the voters determine whether or not the legislative
candidates in one party represent the seats won by a party. In the context of
electoral competition, it is more determined by the victory over internal party
competitors (Selb & Lutz, 2015). To beat their
party rivals, candidates need different tactics, and one way is to conduct
vote-buying operations (Aspinall, 2015).
CONCLUSION
This article describes Indonesia's electoral
democracy, which is corrupted by the practice of buying and selling votes,
which is not only prominent in legislative elections at national level but also
in regional head elections. Whether recognized or not, money politics is a very
scary ghost for the democratic process in Indonesia. Politics and money are two
different things but cannot be separated from one another because politics
requires money. With money, people can do politics, especially with an open
proportional system, which requires candidates to differentiate tactics. One
way is to conduct vote-buying operations. Suppose the practice of money politics
is not immediately addressed. In that case, it will lead to complicated
accountability and bureaucratic representation problems. Money politics in
Indonesia undermines the accountability of the policy-making and representation
process, both in the Legislature and the Executive.
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