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# The Effectiveness of Investigations and Prosecutions of Corruption Crimes by the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office: A Study of the Power of Power in Criminal Law Enforcement

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## ABSTRACT

This research analyzes the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions of corruption crimes conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Indonesian National Police, and the Indonesian Attorney General's Office, focusing on the dynamics of authority disputes within the national law enforcement system. The multiplicity of law enforcement agencies authorized to investigate corruption has created institutional complexity, disharmony of authority, and potential inter-institutional competition that affect the effectiveness of the case-handling process. This research uses a comparative legal system approach by comparing Indonesia's multi-agency model with jurisdictions that adopt a single-agency model with exclusive authority in eradicating corruption. The research results show that the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is relatively high due to strong regulatory support, independence, and institutional focus on corruption. In contrast, the Police and the Prosecutor's Office face structural constraints, extensive caseloads, and limited coordination, which affect the quality of case handling. Authority disputes among institutions often give rise to overlapping processes, delays in case handling, and legal uncertainty in determining the most competent institution. Comparisons with other national legal systems show that countries implementing a single-agency model, such as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong, are more effective in handling corruption due to clear authority, minimal jurisdictional conflict, and a rapid investigation process. This research concludes that the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution mechanisms in Indonesia needs to be strengthened through the reconstruction of authority design, the strengthening of systemic coordination, and the establishment of clearer jurisdictional boundaries among law enforcement institutions.

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## INTRODUCTION

Corruption is an extraordinary crime that requires extraordinary measures through law enforcement institutions with broad, independent, and effective authority. In Indonesia, the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes is distributed among three institutions: the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and the

Indonesian Attorney General's Office (AGO) (Prissandi et al., 2023). This division of authority is intended to strengthen checks and balances in eradicating corruption. However, in practice, issues of overlapping authority, structural disharmony, and political-legal tensions arise, thereby affecting the effectiveness of law enforcement (Ayu et al., 2025; Hutabarat et al., 2025; Karyonol, 2026; Prissandi et al., 2023).

The KPK was established as an independent institution authorized to investigate, inquire into, and prosecute certain corruption crimes. However, the amendment to the KPK Law through Law No. 19 of 2019 resulted in a shift in authority that is considered to have the potential to weaken the institution's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the Police and the Attorney General's Office, as the primary organs of conventional law enforcement, face structural constraints, high caseloads, and various integrity issues (Asis, 2024; Simatupang, 2025; Zaini & Ridho, 2023). The interaction among these three institutions creates a dynamic tug-of-war over authority that affects the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions of corruption crimes (Diar et al., 2025; Nazarko, 2023).

Corruption is a serious threat to democracy and development. In Indonesia, law enforcement against corruption involves the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and the Indonesian Attorney General's Office (AGO) (Salim et al., 2025; Suadi, 2021; Susilo, 2023). These three institutions are granted investigative and prosecutorial authority, but this division of authority often gives rise to overlapping jurisdiction, institutional rivalry, and authority disputes (Kwon, 2024; Rubin & Feeley, 2021).

Several studies have examined the dynamics of corruption eradication institutions in Indonesia, both separately and comparatively. Butt (2011) analyzed the constitutional position of the KPK and found that institutional weakening through amendments to the KPK Law could potentially reduce the effectiveness of corruption eradication. Setiyono and McLeod (2010) examined the political dynamics behind the establishment and institutional changes of the KPK, concluding that political resistance significantly influenced the performance of this institution. Schütte (2012) compared the KPK with anti-corruption commissions in Hong Kong, namely the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), and Singapore, namely the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), finding that the KPK has strong formal authority but remains more vulnerable to political intervention than its two counterparts.

In the context of conventional law enforcement institutions, Diprose et al. (2019) studied corruption in the Indonesian National Police and found that structural reforms have not been fully successful in eliminating corrupt practices within the institution. McLeod (2010) analyzed the effectiveness of the Attorney General's Office in prosecuting corruption cases, concluding that political intervention and weak institutional integrity are the main obstacles. Pramono (2020) examined the overlapping authority among the KPK, the Police, and the AGO, finding that the lack of clear coordination mechanisms is the primary cause of inter-institutional conflict.

Hendri (2021) studied the dynamics of authority disputes among anti-corruption institutions after Law No. 19 of 2019 and found that the amendment weakened the KPK's position within the law enforcement ecosystem. Hamzah (2018) conducted a comparative study of anti-corruption institutions in several Asian countries, concluding that institutional independence is a key factor in successful corruption eradication. Kurniawan and Prabowo

(2022) analyzed the relationship between the KPK and conventional law enforcement institutions from the perspective of legal politics, finding that political interests often overshadow technical-legal considerations in the division of investigative authority.

However, previous research still has several limitations. First, most studies focus on one institution separately without comprehensively analyzing the interaction dynamics among the three institutions simultaneously (Amable, 2016; Gray et al., 2015; Jonas Frödin, 2024). Second, comparative studies with countries such as Hong Kong, through the ICAC, and Singapore, through the CPIB, have been conducted but have not been integrated with a structural analysis of the division of authority in Indonesia's positive law. Third, research on the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions after the amendment of the KPK Law through Law No. 19 of 2019 remains limited. Fourth, no study has systematically examined the suitability of Indonesia's institutional design with the principles of effective law enforcement adopted in modern legal systems (Anwary, 2022; Sangesti, 2025; Zuwanda et al., 2024).

This research offers several novelties. First, this study uses a comparative legal system methodology by examining corruption eradication models in Hong Kong, through the ICAC, and Singapore, through the CPIB, as benchmark institutions that have proven successful. Second, this research analyzes the dynamics of authority distribution among the three institutions, namely the KPK, the Police, and the AGO, simultaneously rather than separately. Third, this study evaluates the impact of the amendment to the KPK Law through Law No. 19 of 2019 on the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions. Fourth, this research examines the suitability of Indonesia's institutional design with the principles of effective law enforcement adopted in modern legal systems, including the principles of independence, accountability, and coordination.

These dynamics affect the effectiveness of investigative and prosecutorial processes and raise the question of whether Indonesia's legal design and inter-institutional relationships align with the principles of effective law enforcement adopted in modern legal systems. To answer this question, this study uses a comparative legal system methodology by examining corruption eradication models in several countries, particularly Hong Kong through the ICAC and Singapore through the CPIB, in order to assess the suitability of Indonesia's institutional design. This study aims to discuss the effectiveness of corruption investigations and prosecutions conducted by the KPK, the National Police, and the AGO, with emphasis on the dynamics of authority and their implications for law enforcement. Theoretically, this research contributes to the development of anti-corruption law theory, particularly regarding the ideal design of anti-corruption institutions based on comparative studies of effective legal systems. Practically, this research provides policy recommendations for regulatory reform concerning the distribution of investigative and prosecutorial authority among anti-corruption institutions, offers input for the government and the House of Representatives in evaluating Law No. 19 of 2019 on the KPK, and serves as a comparative reference for anti-corruption institutions in Indonesia in adopting best practices from Hong Kong, through the ICAC, and Singapore, through the CPIB.

## METHOD

The comparative law method is a scientific approach aimed at understanding, analyzing, and evaluating the legal systems of various countries using specific parameters. In the context of studying the authority of anti-corruption institutions, comparative legal systems are a crucial tool for identifying best practices and addressing weaknesses in national legal models.

Theoretically, comparative law studies not only written regulations (law on the books) but also the behavior of law enforcement institutions, legal culture, the effectiveness of oversight mechanisms, and institutional structures (law in action). Comparative law serves as a tool for understanding how values, politics, and social dynamics shape the institutional design of law enforcement in various jurisdictions. Thus, this method goes beyond simply "comparing texts" to examining the relationship between norms, institutions, and law enforcement practices (David & Brierley, 1985; Zweigert & Kötz, 1998).

Regarding the anti-corruption agency's jurisdiction, this methodology serves three primary purposes:

- a. Observing how other countries regulate the authority of anti-corruption institutions.  
Through a comparative approach, researchers can assess variations in anti-corruption institutional designs across countries, such as the independent commission model (Hong Kong ICAC), the multi-agency coordination model (the United States and Germany), or the hybrid model (Singapore and Malaysia). Each country has a different authority structure, for example, regarding investigative powers, inquiries, prosecution, asset recovery, and internal and external oversight mechanisms. This analysis helps understand how certain structural choices influence the effectiveness of corruption law enforcement (Pieth, 2012; Tan, 2008).
- b. Assessing the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Indonesian Model  
By comparing the KPK–Polri–AGO design with other anti-corruption agencies, researchers can identify unique Indonesian issues, such as duplication of authority, overlapping investigative functions, and political dependence on certain institutions. The comparison also reveals the extent to which the Indonesian system meets the principles of independence, institutional capacity, inter-agency coordination, and the integrity of law enforcement officials. These weaknesses become more apparent when placed within a comparative analysis framework (Butt & Lindsey, 2018).
- c. Drawing normative lessons for reform recommendations  
Comparison of legal systems serves to provide a rational basis for formulating legal reform recommendations. The lessons learned are not simply imitation, but contextual adaptation, that is, adapting international best practices to Indonesia's political and legal needs. For example, the Hong Kong ICAC's supervision and oversight model can serve as inspiration for strengthening oversight of investigators; Singapore's coordinated prosecution model can serve as a basis for formulating the working association between the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Attorney General's Office; or the United States' joint task force model can inspire the integration of cross-agency investigative systems. Within this framework, a comparison of legal systems serves as both an empirical and theoretical basis for designing anti-corruption institutional reforms in Indonesia (Örücü, 2012; OECD, 2020).

The data analysis technique used in this study is qualitative descriptive analysis through three stages. First, data reduction, which is the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, and grouping legal materials that are relevant to the issue of the division of authority for the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes in Indonesia as well as comparisons with Hong Kong and Singapore. Second, data display, which is to compile legal materials that have been reduced to the form of a systematic narrative based on research themes, such as the regulation of the authority of the KPK, the National Police, and the Prosecutor's Office, the dynamics of overlapping authority, and the corruption eradication model in ICAC and CPIB. Third, conclusion drawing, which is interpreting the meaning of the data that has been analyzed to answer the formulation of research problems, including identifying weaknesses in institutional design in Indonesia and formulating recommendations for improvement based on best practices from Hong Kong and Singapore.

Data analysis is also strengthened by legal interpretation methods, including grammatical interpretation (interpretation according to the text of the law), systematic interpretation (the relationship between articles in one law or between laws), historical interpretation (the background of the formation of laws), and teleological interpretation (the purpose of the formation of laws and regulations). This approach allows researchers to fully understand the design of the authority of law enforcement agencies in the eradication of corruption in Indonesia and its conformity with the principles of effectiveness in the modern legal system.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Authority to Investigate and Prosecute Corruption Crimes in Indonesian Law**

#### **1. Corruption Eradication Commission**

The Corruption Eradication Commission was established and granted authority by Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission. Based on Article 6 of Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is tasked with conducting inquiries, investigations, and prosecutions of corruption crimes. Article 11 of the KPK Law further limits the KPK's authority to conduct inquiries, investigations, and prosecutions to corruption crimes that:

1. involve law enforcement officers and state officials;
2. receive public attention;
3. involve state losses of at least IDR 1,000,000,000.00 (one billion rupiah).

With this shared authority, coordination between the Prosecutor's Office and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is absolutely essential to avoid conflicts of authority when handling corruption cases. However, in practice, there are factors that can impact this relationship, including the KPK's transfer of investigative or prosecutorial authority for corruption cases. The transfer of investigative and prosecutorial authority by the KPK can create disharmony between the Prosecutor's Office and the KPK, or it may not impact the relationship. This all depends on the relationship and coordination between the Prosecutor's Office and the KPK when handling corruption cases.

As a commission with a specific and primary task in eradicating corruption, the KPK has the following duties (Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi; Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, n.d.):

1. Coordinating with authorized agencies to eradicate corruption;
2. supervising agencies authorized to eradicate corruption;
3. conducting investigations, inquiries, and prosecutions of corruption;
4. implementing preventive measures against corruption; and
5. monitoring the implementation of state governance.

Despite its relatively advanced and leading position in eradicating corruption, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been in existence for approximately seven years and still requires significant improvements, refinements, and support from the legal system and the public, both technical and substantive, to successfully carry out its noble task of creating a corruption-free Indonesian nation. These include: (i) the KPK's limited capacity in terms of the quantity and quality of its supporting personnel; (ii) conflicts between other law enforcement agencies (police/prosecutors); (iii) conflicts of interest in eradicating corruption; and (iv) having only an office in Jakarta, with corruption handling covering the entire territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), without representative offices in each region.

As a result of these limitations, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) receives thousands of corruption reports from various regions each year, with only a small fraction being followed up on and successfully resolved. Therefore, handling corruption cases cannot simply be limited to reforming the KPK as an institution; it must also be accompanied by improvements to the legal system related to corruption. So, in legal realism theory, it must be viewed and assessed in light of the social goals sought and the consequences arising from its operation.

## **2. Police**

The National Police's authority in handling corruption is rooted in the principle that the police are the primary investigators (general investigators) in the Indonesian criminal justice system. This normative basis is found in Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the Indonesian National Police. Article 14, paragraph (1), letter g affirms that the National Police have the authority to "conduct inquiries and investigations into all criminal acts under criminal procedure law and other laws and regulations." It means that the authority to investigate corruption is inherent in the general functions of the police (Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Pasal 14 ayat (1) huruf g).

In addition to the Police Law, the National Police's investigative authority is regulated in the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHP), specifically Article 1, point 4 and Article 7, which states that the National Police has the authority to carry out a series of investigative legal actions. More specifically, Law Number 31 of 1999, in conjunction with Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption (the Corruption Law), states that investigations are carried out by the Police and the Prosecutor's Office, and by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) under particular circumstances. Article 39 of the Corruption Law emphasizes that the National Police's investigative authority remains in effect (Kitab Undang-Undang

Hukum Acara Pidana, Pasal 1 angka 4, Pasal 7; Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 jo. Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2001 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pasal 39).

### 3. Prosecutor's Office

As a law enforcement institution that also plays a role in combating corruption, the Prosecutor's Office is one of the state's backbones in eradicating corruption, alongside the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The Prosecutor's Office's authority to conduct investigations is stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2004 concerning the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia. Based on Article 30 of the Prosecutor's Office Law, the Prosecutor's Office is authorized to investigate certain crimes, including corruption. The Prosecutor's Office's authority to prosecute is explicitly stated in Articles 1 and 30 of Law Number 16 of 2004 concerning the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, which emphasizes that the Public Prosecutor is a prosecutor authorized by the Prosecutor's Office Law. In accordance with Article 33, in carrying out its duties and authorities, the Prosecutor's Office fosters cooperative relationships with law enforcement and justice agencies, as well as other state agencies or institutions.

1. In performing its duties, the Prosecutor's Office, in an effort to accelerate the eradication of criminal acts of corruption, takes the following steps (Universitas Negeri Semarang, n.d.):
2. Preparing law enforcers to have specialized expertise in handling corruption crimes, providing officers handling corruption with knowledge of the laws and regulations governing corruption;
3. Holding meetings between law enforcers and relevant agencies to achieve a unified perspective on handling corruption cases;
4. The government is striving to increase employee salaries to improve their well-being. Increased prosperity is expected to discourage employees from engaging in corruption.
5. Implementing management improvements to reduce opportunities for corruption;
6. Encouraging the implementation of embedded oversight, namely supervision carried out by local leaders;
7. Improving morale, including employee morale, law enforcers' morale, and the morale of the community;
8. The Prosecutor's Office is conducting direct supervision of projects suspected of being prone to corruption.

The characteristics of the prosecutor's office, which adheres to a hierarchy with a military culture, place the decisions and orders of superiors or seniors more decisive in determining the success of law enforcement than prosecutorial initiative. Therefore, what occurs at the central level is likely to be followed and replicated at the regional level as well. For example, in the *rentut* (prosecution plan), through the *rentut* mechanism, all prosecutions must be coordinated with the prosecutor above them. In some cases, prosecutions are even carried out directly by the Attorney General's Office. As a result, prosecutors' independence and autonomy in prosecuting cases are inadequate. Prosecution demand can also frustrate young prosecutors with integrity.

Therefore, in an effort to accelerate corruption eradication, the Attorney General's Office has formulated a policy to accelerate the handling and execution of corruption crimes, as follows (Supandji, 2008) :

1. Determining priority sectors for corruption eradication to save state funds, with indicators to be achieved, including:
  - a. Clarifying corruption eradication measures;
  - b. Formulating and establishing criteria for prioritizing existing corruption cases;
  - c. Accelerating the freezing and management of corrupted state assets;
  - d. Cancelling SP3 (Case Termination Orders) for corruption cases that are legally still subject to re-processing;
2. Increasing the capacity of law enforcement officials through the following activities:
  - a. Providing one-stop training for prosecutors and judges on handling corruption;
  - b. Improving the managerial system of law enforcement agencies;
  - c. Improving and implementing guidelines for public service complaints; and
  - d. Implementing professional standards/codes of ethics.

This commitment demonstrates the synergy between state institutions in eradicating corruption, including the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office.

## **Anti-Corruption Institution Models in International Comparison**

### **1. ICAC (Hong Kong)**

In Hong Kong, corruption was a systemic phenomenon from the 1960s to the early 1970s, particularly in the police and public service sectors. This situation rose to acute public distrust of the colonial government and law enforcement agencies. In response, in 1974, the Hong Kong government established a new institution called the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which was given sole and independent authority to handle all corruption cases (Pei, 1980).

The ICAC model has since become one of the world's most successful examples of corruption eradication and is often used as a reference by developing countries. The ICAC's success is underpinned by three key characteristics: sole authority, high independence, and a strong internal oversight system.

The ICAC was established through the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance 1974 by the British Colonial Government in Hong Kong. This establishment transferred corruption investigation authority from the Hong Kong Police Force to an independent agency directly under the Governor. Before the ICAC, corruption was investigated by the Anti-Corruption Office within the police force, but this agency was deemed ineffective due to internal conflicts of interest. This new model is designed to break the chain of structural corruption that has become entrenched within the police force (Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, 1974; Scott, 2011).

## 2. Exclusive Investigation Authority

The ICAC is given sole and exclusive authority to investigate all corruption cases, whether committed by public officials or the private sector, under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) (Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201).

The police do not have parallel authority to investigate corruption, except in the execution of ICAC orders or in special delegated cases. With this concept, Hong Kong adopts a pure single-agency model in eradicating corruption.

## 3. Scope of Authority

The ICAC's authority includes:

- a. receiving reports of suspected corruption;
- b. conducting both covert and overt investigations;
- c. conducting wiretaps, seizures, and searches;
- d. prosecuting (through the Department of Justice after a case is declared complete);
- e. International coordination in asset tracing (Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201).

This broad authority allows the ICAC to act swiftly without bureaucratic hurdles.

## 4. Principles and Mechanisms of ICAC Independence

### a. Structural Independence

The ICAC is directly subordinate to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong (formerly the Governor), not to the police, the judiciary, or any ministry. It creates institutional distance from potential interference (Scott, 2010). It creates institutional distance from potential interference.

The Director of the ICAC is given a fixed term and can only be removed for specific legal reasons. This independence strengthens the ICAC's ability to address high-level corruption, including corruption within the executive branch (Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, 1974, s. 5).

### b. Operational Independence

The ICAC has its own budget, approved directly by the Legislative Council, not by the regular executive ministries. A robust budget allows for the procurement of investigative technology, international training, and the development of a financial intelligence unit (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2019).

### c. Personnel Independence

ICAC staff are not recruited from the police force. Approximately 70–80% come from outside conventional law enforcement agencies, including auditors, forensic accountants, financial analysts, and technology experts. This limits conflicts of interest (Scott, 2011).

## 5. Internal Oversight and Accountability System

The ICAC's success is inseparable from its robust internal oversight system. To maintain public trust, the ICAC established three main oversight committees:

### a. Operations Review Committee (ORC)

This committee consists of members of the public, academia, and the private sector. Its task is to review all ICAC investigative operations, except for certain sensitive cases. The ORC can make recommendations and either halt or

encourage further investigations (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2018a).

b. Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations (CACCR)

This committee oversees the ICAC's prevention and public education programs and ensures that the agency does not act arbitrarily in its social campaigns (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2017).

c. Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee (CPAC)

This committee focuses on developing policy recommendations to public institutions to improve governance and prevent structural corruption (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2016).

These three committees act as internal checks and balances while maintaining transparency and accountability.

6. Advantages of the ICAC Model

a. High Independence

Independence is embedded in the structure, budget, personnel, and decision-making processes. This model allows the ICAC to prosecute high-level corruption, including by police officials, politicians, and bureaucrats (Scott, 2010).

b. Focus on Corruption

The ICAC has no other mandate than to eradicate corruption. It allows for full concentration, unlike the multi-agency model, where the police and prosecutors have a heavy caseload (UNODC, 2014).

c. Strict Internal Oversight

Strict oversight prevents abuse of authority and ensures the ICAC maintains public legitimacy (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2018b).

7. The ICAC model offers several important lessons for Indonesia:

The effectiveness of corruption eradication increases if the institution has a single authority.

a. structural independence needs to be constitutionally guaranteed;

b. Strong internal oversight is crucial to prevent abuse of power.

c. Recruitment of investigators must be cross-professional to enhance professionalism.

Indonesia uses a multi-agency approach with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the National Police, and the Prosecutor's Office, resulting in a high potential for conflict of authority. The ICAC provides a simpler, more focused, and more coordinated model.

The Hong Kong ICAC is a successful example of an anti-corruption institution with a single investigative authority, high independence, and a strict oversight system. The ICAC's institutional structure demonstrates that law enforcement against corruption requires an institutional design that is free from interference, focused on a single type of crime, and has strong accountability mechanisms. Hong Kong's experience provides an important reference for institutional reforms to eradicate corruption in Indonesia.

## 2. CPIB (Singapore)

Singapore consistently ranks among the top in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). One key factor is the role of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), which has held sole authority over corruption investigations and prosecutions since 1952. Unlike other countries that adopt a multi-agency model, Singapore adopts a single-agency exclusive jurisdiction, where all corruption cases must be handled by the CPIB without overlap with the police or other agencies (Johnston, 2014).

The approach creates legal certainty, a clear structure of responsibilities, and avoids institutional rivalries that often hinder corruption eradication in various countries.

### 1. Legal Basis

The CPIB was established under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), which grants it full authority to:

- a. conduct investigations,
- b. make arrests,
- c. examine financial transactions,
- d. conduct searches, and
- e. Cooperate with international institutions (Prevention of Corruption Act, Singapore Statutes, ss. 3–6).

The PCA is the legal basis that forms the backbone of Singapore's anti-corruption efforts.

### 2. Institutional Structure and Position

The CPIB is subordinate to the Prime Minister. However, if an investigation involves officials in the Prime Minister's office, the CPIB has the authority to request direct permission from the President to proceed without the Prime Minister's approval. This structure provides two guarantees (Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, Art. 22G):

- a. Direct access to the highest executive authority,
- b. Protection from political conflicts of interest.

### 3. Exclusive Jurisdiction Against Corruption

Unlike many other countries, Singapore grants the CPIB exclusive jurisdiction to address corruption. The implications of this exclusivity are (Quah, 2011):

- a. The police have no parallel authority,
- b. There is no power struggle between agencies,
- c. Case handling is faster,
- d. There is only one agency with vertical responsibility.

### 4. The advantages of Singapore's CPIB model are:

#### a. Speedy Investigation Process

Speed is one of the most prominent characteristics of the CPIB. It is possible by:

- 1) a streamlined organizational structure,
- 2) no need for coordination with the police or other agencies,
- 3) direct authority to make arrests,

- 4) and
- 5) a swift process of handing over cases to the Attorney-General's Chambers (A-GC) as public prosecutor (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 2022).

Singapore adheres to the principle of swift and certain punishment, which increases the deterrent effect and prevents the destruction of evidence.

b. Full Political Support

The CPIB's success stems not only from the law but also from strong political will. Since the time of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the government has adopted a principle of zero tolerance for corruption (Lee, 2000).

- 1) Forms of political support include:
- 2) adequate budget funding,
- 3) legal protection for CPIB investigators,
- 4) no interference in the investigation process,
- 5) regulatory reforms to expand CPIB's authority.

This comprehensive political support allows the CPIB to take action against high-ranking officials without political hindrance.

c. Use of Modern Investigative Tools

The CPIB is known as an institution that implements highly sophisticated investigative technology, including:

- 1) a digital forensic laboratory,
- 2) electronic transaction data analysis tools,
- 3) high-tech covert surveillance,
- 4) cyber investigations to track digital assets and communications,
- 5) International Financial Intelligence Cooperation (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 2024).

Technology investments enable the CPIB to investigate cases with strong, verifiable evidence.

The CPIB is a favorite example in comparative studies because:

- 1) Exclusive authority creates efficiency,
- 2) Stable political support ensures independence,
- 3) Modern technology strengthens the quality of investigations,
- 4) A single structure avoids conflicts of authority.

Many ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, consider the CPIB a benchmark for anti-corruption reform. The CPIB is one of the most effective anti-corruption agencies in the world due to its exclusive jurisdiction over corruption, expeditious investigation processes, comprehensive political support, and state-of-the-art investigative technology. Singapore demonstrates that successful corruption eradication is not only a matter of law, but also related to a stable institutional design, the independence of investigators, and consistent political commitment.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis in this paper, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of corruption investigations and prosecutions in Indonesia still faces structural and normative obstacles,

particularly related to overlapping authorities between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Normatively, the three institutions have a clear legal basis for handling corruption, but in practice, there is regulatory disharmony, differing interpretations of authority, and weak coordination mechanisms. First, the Police, as general investigators under the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), have broad authority to handle all crimes, including corruption. Second, the Prosecutor's Office has special authority to investigate certain crimes, including corruption. Third, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), as an independent institution, was established with a specific mandate to conduct inquiries, inquests, and prosecutions of corruption cases, with a system of coordination and supervision over the other two institutions. This tug-of-war over authority arises from the lack of a limited division of authority and the absence of binding and operational guidelines for coordination and supervision. As a result, duplication of case handling, conflicts of authority, and potential obstruction of justice occur, potentially undermining corruption eradication efforts.

From a comparative legal system perspective, countries such as Hong Kong (ICAC) and Singapore (CPIB) exemplify ideal models of centralized, independent, and single-authority anti-corruption institutions. With a clear and established model, there is no overlapping authority, as in Indonesia. This comparison shows that the effectiveness of corruption law enforcement is significantly influenced by the clarity of the authority structure and the firmness of the institutional structure. Therefore, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of handling corruption crimes in Indonesia is not optimal, and structural measures are needed to eliminate conflicts of authority and strengthen the integration of the law enforcement system.

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